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ABSTRACT

TWO ESSAYS ON ANTECEDENTS AND EFFECTS OF BOARD FEMALE
REPRESENTATION NON-CONFORMITY

Fatemeh Askarzadeh
Old Dominion University, 2021
Director: Dr. William Q. Judge
Despite mounting societal demands for board gender diversity, some firms deviate below
traditional norms, i.e., under-conform to expectations, while others adhere to them. To explain this
variation within a national context, we build on insights from the emerging corporate governance
deviance theory and gender role congruity theory. Using panel data on a globally-representative
set of firms, Essay 1 shows that firms with higher entrepreneurial orientation are more likely to go
below the national norms for board gender diversity. Our results also reveal that having more slack
resources weakens the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and under-conformity.
This study contributes to the comparative gender diversity literature and augments our knowledge
of the institutional logics perspective for a global investigation of gender diversity on the board.
Given the current popularity of board gender composition arguments, particularly in comparative
corporate governance literature, and growing attention to the organizational agency, the
intersection of these two provides a ground that is of interest for scholars of both institutional
theory and corporate governance field.
Also, previous studies acknowledge the importance of isomorphic institutional norms to explain
performance implications of the gender profiles of board of directors, leaving the variation within
the same national or industry context unexplored. Building on insights from resource dependence
theory, Essay 2 examines whether and how deviating above the industry norms (i.e., overconformity) for female representation on boardrooms has different performance consequences for
firms, depending on the stakeholder group influenced. Specifically, we find that accounting
performance is reinforced as perceived by the managers and employees within the firm; market
performance is unaffected as perceived by shareholders, and innovation performance is decreased
as perceived by innovation resource providers. Hence, the performance effect of over-conformity
depends on the stakeholder group considered. Overall, we contribute to resource dependence
theory by emphasizing the role of various stakeholders in valuation of women’s presence.
Moreover, this study extends our understanding of the boundary conditions for value creation by
female directors by focusing on corporate governance deviance literature.
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CHAPTER 1
GENDER DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS WITHIN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVIANCE PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT
Despite mounting societal demands for board gender diversity, some firms deviate below
traditional norms, i.e., under-conform to expectations, while others adhere to them. To explain this
variation within a national context, we build on insights from the emerging corporate governance
deviance theory and gender role congruity theory. Using panel data on a globally-representative
set of firms, we show that firms with higher entrepreneurial orientation are more likely to go below
the national norms for board gender diversity. Our results also reveal that having more slack
resources weakens the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and under-conformity.
This study contributes to the comparative gender diversity literature and augments our knowledge
of the institutional logics perspective for a global investigation of gender diversity on the board.

Key Words: Board Gender Diversity, Comparative Corporate Governance, Deviation,
Entrepreneurial Orientation, Institutional Logics.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Female presence on the board of directors has become an increasing focus of scholarly research
(e.g., Guldiken, Mallon, Fainshmidt & Judge, 2018; Knippen, Shen & Zhu, 2019) and the popular
press (e.g., Green, 2019; World Development Report., 2012), due to its notable impact on
organizational outcomes (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Cumming, Leung, & Rui, 2015) yet slow
progress in diversification (Terjesen, Aguilera & Lorenz, 2015). Recent attempts toward
addressing imbalanced gender representation on public corporate boards (e.g., Strøm, 2019;
Zhang, 2012) make understanding the predictors of intentional deviation below the norm a vitally
important practical matter. After mounting demands for increasing gender diversity (Zhang, 2012),
board female representation has improved somewhat (Bertrand, Black, Jensen & Lleras-Muney,
2019). However, in some firms, women still face the glass ceiling, i.e., obstacles in reaching key
organizational positions (2020 Women on Boards, 2017; Economist, 2011; Raleigh, 2018). As a
result, board female representation in those firms deviates below the institutional average. What
might explain this deviant behavior?
While the literature suggests that institutional logics, i.e., socially-constructed values,
beliefs, rules, and practices (Thornton & Ocasio 1999), can influence board gender composition
(e.g., Terjesen & Singh, 2008), the deviation from these logics is not well understood in
comparative gender diversity literature. This study is motivated by this gap in the literature and
call for research on the impact of organizational identity on strategic responses to institutional
processes, which vary by different receptivity to normative constraints (Durand & Thornton, 2018;
Edman, 2016). As a result of this gap, we investigate how the entrepreneurial orientation of a firm,
i.e., innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness (Miller, 1983) impacts the deviation in board
gender composition. The rise of interest in the organizational agency, i.e., a purposive departure
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from the norms of a referent group (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004), has been fast and recent (SakaHelmhout, 2020). In line with the recent researches that examine organizational agency (e.g.,
Edman, 2016; Newenham-Kahindi & Stevens, 2018), this study explores a potential determinant
of agency in the context of board gender composition.
We use insights from the emerging corporate governance deviance theory (Aguilera, Judge
& Terjesen, 2018) and gender role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) to argue that firms
with entrepreneurial orientation (EO) are more likely to deviate below the institutional norms for
board gender diversity. Entrepreneurial orientation facilitates the required steps for deviant
behavior, i.e., awareness, accessibility, and activation (Thornton et al., 2012). According to
theorizing by Aguilera et al (2018), firms high on EO are much more likely to adopt practices that
don't fit the institutional prescriptions. Furthermore, the theory suggests that they are more likely
to have the confidence to deviate from traditional behavior (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001) and more
concern for novelty and nonconforming behavior (Navis & Glynn, 2011). Consequently, we
explore the notion that firms with relatively strong entrepreneurial orientations are more likely to
deviate below the institutional demands to increase board gender diversity since women have been
traditionally considered less favorable for entrepreneurial activities (e.g., Carter, Shaw, Lam &
Wilson, 2007; Marlow & Patton, 2005; Powell & Eddleston, 2013). Bold entrepreneurial action is
presumed to be a masculine endeavor (Alsos, Isaksen & Ljunggren, 2006) and there are
considerable stereotypes against women in entrepreneurial contexts (Balachandra, Briggs,
Eddleston & Brush, 2013).
The previous literature on the determinants of board female representation is mainly
divided into two streams. One stream deals with the direct and indirect impact of the macro
environment and institutional explanations (e.g., Desender, Aguilera, Lópezpuertas‐Lamy &
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Crespi, 2016; Gabaldon, De Anca, Mateos de Cabo & GimEO, 2016; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011;
Terjesen, Aguilera & Lorenz, 2015; Terjesen & Singh, 2008; Nelson & Levesque, 2007). The other
stream deals with the impact of micro-level factors such as firm size, industry type and strategic
leaders’ attributes (e.g., Brammer, Millington & Pavelin, 2007; Fryxell & Lerner, 1989; Geiger &
Marlin, 2012; Guldiken et al., 2018; Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella Jr, 2007; Hyland &
Marcellino, 2002; Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Ryan & Haslam, 2007). These
two streams have evolved separately and are focused on either institutional or organizational
drivers solely. Thus, there is a need for a study that takes into account the interaction of
organizational and institutional factors to explain the distribution of board gender diversity within
a national setting.
Furthermore, previous gender diversity research has primarily focused on the effects of
board gender composition (mainly firm performance) than its antecedents. In other words, current
literature generally takes female representation on board as exogenous (Hillman et al., 2007).
Given the significance of board composition and its influence on strategy formation and firm
outcomes (e.g., Hambrick, 2007; Judge & Talaulicar, 2017), it is also essential to study its
antecedents. We believe that this is the first study that brings organizational agency into the study
of institutional processes for board female representation. Given the variation in institutional logics
for board female representation across countries (e.g., Grosvold, Rayton & Brammer, 2016) and
the importance of institutional demands for embedded firms (Thornton & Ocasio 1999), it’s
important to examine organizational practices for board gender composition with an eye on
institutional demands. Overall, this study contributes to better delineation of the link between
micro and macro levels of analysis for board female presence.
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Finally, the literature on the determinants of board gender diversity also suffers from the
lack of theory and needs finer-grained researches (Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009). We contributed
to this important organizational phenomenon by bringing the recently developed theory of
corporate governance deviance along with gender role congruity theory. Moreover, we refine and
extend corporate governance deviance theory (CGDT). While CGDT explains deviation from
norms, it does not make clear the direction of deviation, i.e., whether it goes below or above the
norm. Using gender role congruity theory (GRCT), we provide insight into this issue by explaining
which direction is more congruent with entrepreneurial identity in the context of our study.
Additionally, this study shows a boundary condition of CGDT and argues that in some conditions
the impact of EO on deviation reduces.

2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
The traditional focus of institutional literature was on isomorphism, while neo-institutionalism
(Powell & DiMaggio, 2012) pays more attention to the variety of organizations’ responses to the
institutional logic (Heugens & Lander, 2009; Powell & DiMaggio, 2012; Walls & Hoffman, 2013).
Institutional logic refers to the “set of assumptions and values, usually implicit, about how to
interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to succeed”
(Thornton and Ocasio 1999: 804). Based on the institutional logics perspective (Friedland &
Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), social values, beliefs, rules, and practices
are the fundamental mechanisms determining organizational practices. Nonconformity can reduce
the firm’s legitimacy (Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008), while conformance with norms allows
organizations to better benefit from external resources, which in turn serve to decrease costs of
operation in the environment (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Therefore, board composition in
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the same institutional context are expected to follow a similar general pattern to enhance the firm’s
legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dobbin, Kim & Kalev, 2011; Lynall, Golden & Hillman,
2003). In other words, adhering to institutional demands for the female presence signals credibility
and improve the firm image (Perrault, 2015).
In contrast, deviance from institutional logic, i.e., “intentional behaviors that depart from
the norms of a referent group” (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004: 828) is also a key source for
competitive advantage and survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Firms that deviate from established
norms gain an advantage of entrepreneurial surprise (Chen & MacMillan, 1992) and are difficult
to copy and counterattack (Chen & Miller, 1994). Given the various consequences of a strategic
response to institutional processes, firms differ in their preferences for institutional conformity. As
a result, institutional research, which traditionally has been too centered on non-agentic
institutional forces, needs to also pay attention to organizational forces (DiMaggio & Powell,
1991) to be able to explain agentic deviant behavior in terms of board gender composition.
While there is a global societal demand for increasing board gender diversity, there is
notable variation across countries and some nations are more advanced than others in terms of
their institutional prescriptions for female representation. In addition to the national level factors,
board gender diversity can also vary depending on its industry context (e.g., Carter, Simkins &
Simpson, 2003; Grosvold, Brammer & Rayton, 2007; McCormick Hyland & Marcellino, 2002).
Different industries are associated with diverse female representation. Some industries are maledominated, while some others are female-dominated (Cumming, Leung & Rui, 2015).
2.1. Corporate Governance Deviance Theory
Organizational identity is what is central, distinctive, and enduring about an organization (Albert
& Whetten, 1985). The link between identity and strategy is well-documented in the literature
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(e.g., Fiol, 2001). Identity acts as a lens affecting organizational actions and helping define issues
as threats or opportunities (Dutton, Dukerich & Harquail, 1994). As a result, organizational
identity can impact the interpretation and preference of firms for institutional conformity.
According to CGDT (Aguilera et al., 2018), the centrality of entrepreneurial identity is the primary
driver of deviant behavior in corporate governance practices. Firms with entrepreneurial
orientation have more tendency to pursue strategies that do not conform to institutional
prescriptions.
Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) refers to the strategy-making processes that provide
organizations with a basis for entrepreneurial decisions and actions (e.g., Wiklund, 1999; Wiklund
& Shepherd, 2003). In this study, we assume that entrepreneurial orientation is a reasonable proxy
for the overall entrepreneurial identify of the firm.

Entrepreneurial orientation has three

dimensions,

and

including

innovativeness,

risk-taking,

proactiveness

(Miller,

1983).

Innovativeness as a critical source of competitive advantage (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010) is “the
predisposition to engage in creativity and experimentation through the introduction of new
products/services as well as technological leadership via R&D in new processes”. Risk-taking
involves “taking bold actions by venturing into the unknown, borrowing heavily, and/or
committing significant resources to ventures in uncertain environments”. Proactiveness refers to
“an opportunity-seeking, forward-looking perspective characterized by the introduction of new
products and services ahead of the competition and acting in anticipation of future demand”
(Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin & Frese, 2009:763).
EO has been found to have significant implications for organizational outcomes (for a
review see Wales, 2016). Firms with a pronounced EO have better capabilities required in each
stage of the socio-cognitive process of deviance from national logic for governance practices
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(Aguilera et al., 2018). These stages include awareness, accessibility, and activation (Thornton et
al., 2012). Awareness refers to the recognition of alternative courses of action, accessibility
describes the situation in which the likelihood of agentic behavior is increased due to the notable
conflict between a firm’s identity and institutional logic, and activation refers to the actual misfit
between firm’s practices and national logic.
Firms with high levels of EO, search more and have broader knowledge about alternative
courses of action. Therefore, they are more alert to new practices (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland &
Sirmon, 2009), which in turn can serve to enhance distinctiveness. Firms with high EO are assumed
to be more likely to find their own internal logic to deal with their challenges rather than blindly
following the institutional direction. Consequently, entrepreneurial identity can increase
governance discretion, i.e. “firm’s cognitive latitude of action to consider the adoption of a deviant
governance practice” (Aguilera et al., 2018: 94). Finally, the broader knowledge and the greater
discretion increase the likelihood that a firm activates an alternative action that deviates from
established logics (Seo & Creed, 2002). Entrepreneurial orientation increases the tendency for
novel and nonconforming behavior (Navis & Glynn, 2011) and enhances the firm’s confidence to
deviate from the majority (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001).
2.2. Gender Role Congruity Theory
Gender role congruity theory (GRCT) builds upon research into gender stereotypes. It argues that
individuals are viewed more favorably when beliefs about how men and women should behave
are congruent with the understandings of how men and women behave (Eagly & Karau, 2002).
Gender stereotypes can also affect how women are judged about their abilities in entrepreneurial
contexts (Buss, 1989). Entrepreneurship is historically perceived to be a male-dominated activity
(Alsos et al., 2006), which can result in stereotypical bias against women. Since being involved
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with entrepreneurial roles is perceived to have predominantly masculine characteristics (Gupta,
Turban, Wasti & Sikdar, 2009), women have been traditionally considered less favorable for
entrepreneurship positions (e.g., Carter, Shaw, Lam & Wilson, 2007; Eddleston, Ladge, Mitteness
& Balachandra, 2016; Gupta et al., 2009; Marlow & Patton, 2005; Powell & Eddleston, 2013).
Organizational identity is the key filter to help firms make sense of and respond to
institutional demands (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014). Therefore, the centrality of entrepreneurial
identity can impact firms’ preferences for strategic responses to institutional demands for female
representation. As a result, firms with relatively high EO may have a tendency to avoid normative
logic that they find incongruent with their identity. Academic findings on the difference between
men and women in terms of self-efficacy (Verheul, Uhlaner & Thurik, 2005), risk-taking attitudes
(Byrnes, Miller & Schafer, 1999; Jeong & Harrison, 2017), entrepreneurial family background
(Matthews and Moser, 1996) and entrepreneurial education (Peterman and Kennedy, 2003) may
reinforce the stereotypes for gender role congruence with entrepreneurial activities.
Such stereotypes based on which women candidates are not perceived as an ideal fit for
entrepreneurial positions (e.g., Powell & Eddleston, 2013) can drive female underrepresentation
in firms with EO. The board of directors is the “strategic apex” of any organization and central to
corporate governance (Walls & Hoffman, 2013). It should be in line with and contribute to
maintaining and strengthening organizational identity. Institutional prescriptions for increasing
board female representation, which aim to meet the interest of multiple stakeholders (e.g., Zhang,
2012) may conflict with perceptions toward favorable and preferred board composition. This
conflict can lead to deviation, particularly in the national contexts such as the United States, in
which the impetus for demographic policies primarily comes from private initiatives and interests
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(Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009). In general, stereotypes against women in entrepreneurship filed
is well-documented in gender role congruity literature (Carter et al., 2007).

2.3. The Intersection between Institutional Logics and Agentic Behavior
According to the insight from corporate governance deviance theory, we expect that firms with
relatively high levels entrepreneurial orientation are more likely to deviate from institutional logics
for board female representation. Additional insight from gender role congruity theory helps us to
predict this deviation to be reflected in under-conformity, i.e. deviation below the norm. Reports
indicate notable board female underrepresentation in high-tech industries (Vigo, 2019), which are
advanced in innovativeness (Hirsch-Kreinsen & Jacobson, 2008), and this results in a smaller pool
of experienced female candidates for the board of firms with entrepreneurial orientation. “Despite
women higher education level overall, the men dominate in the leadership positions, in the pipeline
to a board membership” (Strøm, 2019:34). Lower visibility and network around business people
result in a smaller pool of qualified women for board positions. Firms with technology intensity
spend more on R&D and are high in innovativeness (Fontenele, Cabral, Forte & Costa, 2016). The
technology sector has a reputation for lagging in board female representation (Vell report, 2017).
In 2014 technology companies in the S&P 500 had the second-lowest female representation, and
despite the growing number of women in director positions on tech company boards, women were
still filling only 6.8% of those positions (Equilar, 2015).
In addition to the smaller pool of female candidates for firms with EO, an alternative
explanation for the under-conformity is that women may not self-select into board positions of
these firms. Serving on the board of firms with entrepreneurial identity requires attitudes that
women may find incongruent with theirs. For example, due to the perceptions toward gender and
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risk (e.g., Jeong & Harrison, 2017), women may find the willingness to take a risk; as a primary
factor in entrepreneurial orientation (Rauch, Wiklund, Freese & Lumpkin, 2004) less congruent
with their attitudes. Gender stereotypes may exist in not only how people evaluate women but also
how women evaluate themselves. Moreover, the organizational culture of commitment to social
norms is a strong predictor of adoption of diversity practices (Dobbin et al., 2011). Therefore,
firms with EO, which have mainly the culture of deviation and lack of commitment to norms
(Navis & Glynn, 2011), have less tendency to adopt gender diversity reforms. Building on the
reasoning mentioned above, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: The entrepreneurial orientation of the firm will be negatively
associated with female representation on the board with respect to national and
industry norms for board gender diversity (i.e., under- conformity).

2.4. The Moderating Role of Firm’s Slack Resources
Corporate Governance Deviance Theory argues that the internal governance capacity moderates
the influence of entrepreneurial identity on a firm’s deviance behavior. One kind of governance
capacity is the firm’s financial slack. Slack resources are the pool of capital above the minimum
requirement for a given level of production (Nohria & Gulati, 1996) or “potentially utilizable
[capital] that can be diverted or redeployed for the achievement of organizational goals” (George,
2005: 661). Firms with slack resources are believed to be better off in following their strategies.
Yet, there is mixed findings for the impact of slack on organizational outcomes. On the one hand,
excess resources are conceptualized as a buffer of risk so that they can facilitate engaging in radical
initiatives (Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996) such as deviation from national logic. On the other hand,
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slacks may foster inefficiency and passivity (Cyert & March, 1963) due to lower felt sense of
urgency. Hence it can decrease the motivation required for adopting deviant behavior.
The former perspective supports the notion that the chance of firm’s transition from
accessibility to activation—the last stage of deviation— is heightened by having resources
(Aguilera et al., 2018), because they provide more governance capacity for deviation and
entrepreneurial action (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005; Zahra, 1996). A deviation can decrease the
firm’s legitimacy, and, subsequently the firm’s access to external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik,
2003). This concern is alleviated by having slack.
The latter perspective, however, argues for the negative impact of slack on deviant
behavior. Although firms with more slack are less dependent on external resources (Voss,
Sirdeshmukh & Voss, 2008), empirical studies have mostly supported the fact that having slack
inhibits risk-taking and searching for novelty (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Sitkin, See, Miller, Lawless
& Carton, 2011). The organizational passivity caused by slack (Cyert & March, 1963; Kraatz &
Zajac, 2001) can deter firms from engaging in the stages of deviant behavior including awareness,
accessibility, and activation (Thornton et al., 2012). It can hinder the incentive for searching
alternative courses of action, which can trigger a domino effect to decreases the latitude of action
and the actual misfit between a firm's practices and national logic. Indeed, slack resources function
as an “inertia” and “complacency-fostering buffer” (Sitkin, See, Miller, Lawless & Carton, 2011).
Deviance from institutional logic can be a source of competitive advantage (Chen &
MacMillan, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), through which firms can enhance the reputation and
financial performance (e.g., Garg, 2013). However, according to behavioral theory, an abundance
of slack may result in satisfying and irrational optimism in strategy making (e.g., Cyert & March,
1963; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001), which can downplay the need for distinctiveness. Benefits of
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deviation from institutional norms (e.g., Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) are less likely to attract
attention in the presence of slack resources.
The latter perspective, i.e., the downside of slack, is more likely to hold about predicting
nonconformity behavior. Scholars argue that slack is just beneficial when a perceived
environmental threat is high (e.g., Voss et al., 2008). Nonconformity refers to the intentional
departure from institutional norms (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004: 828), which is unlikely to
originate from a threat in the environment. Firms that decide to deviate need to exit from the inertia
and complacency and to engage in distinctive behavior. This is more compatible with the latter
perspective for slack resources. Hence, we expect slack resources to weaken the tendency to
deviate and hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: The negative impact of entrepreneurial orientation on board gender
diversity is weaker when the firm’s slack is high.

2.5. The Moderating Role of the Extent of Regulatory Enforcement
Corporate Governance Deviance Theory also argues that the extent of regulatory enforcement
attenuates the impact of deviant behavior. It is particularly important to investigate the impact of
regulatory enforcement because this institutional dimension is a key contextual contingency that
can affect organizational behavior regarding national norms (Pache & Santos, 2010). It can also
vary significantly across countries (e.g., Levi‐Faur, 2006). The extent of regulatory enforcement
refers to the intensity of monitoring and penalizing for illegal organizational actions (e.g.,
Banerjee, 2011). It makes institutional demands more formalized and puts higher pressures on
firms to adhere to institutional logic. When institutional demands are “rule-like” it would be more
costly for firms interested in nonconformity to deviate from national logic (Aguilera et al., 2018).
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Due to the predictable sanctions for firms that violate rules, the high extent of regulatory
enforcement can attenuate the nonconformity behavior of the firms. The introduction of board
gender quota in Norway did not meet its goals until it was tightened in 2005 by legislating
sanctions that threatened non-compliant companies to dissolution (Storvik & Teigen, 2010).
Gender equality in organizations is of particular interest to regulators and a way to appease
multiple stakeholders (Dobbin et al., 2011). Despite the progress on female presence, women are
still underrepresented on corporate boards (e.g., Terjesen et al., 2015). Some countries have
enacted guidelines or laws to accelerate the improvement in board female representation to
increase board gender diversity. Some of them have soft laws, some others have hard laws and
some others have no mandate for women's presence. Evidence shows the notable variation across
countries for the type of law they follow (e.g., Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance, 2017).
Operating in countries with strong enforcement for board female representation hinders the
likelihood that firms interested in nonconformance adopt deviant behavior. Lax regulation makes
it easier for firms to fall outside the zone of conformity to national logic. In these contexts firm’s
deviant behavior is less likely to be prosecuted and inhibited by the regulatory frameworks (e.g.,
Jackson, 2007). In countries with regulations for women's presence, explicit and coercive
enforcement increases the cost of not following the institutional logic. In other words, a high extent
of regulatory enforcement weakens the likelihood that firms interested in deviation adopt deviant
behavior. So:
Hypothesis 3: The negative impact of entrepreneurial orientation on board gender
diversity is weaker when the extent of regulatory enforcement within a national
economy is high.
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Data and sample: The sample used in this paper is constructed from a dataset obtained from
Bloomberg, which is a comprehensive database that tracks information for a global set of firms.
We focus on publicly-traded companies in 17 major countries from 2012-2018. These countries
cumulatively account for 73 percent of global GDP. We have observations from Europe (including
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom),
Australasia, Asia (including China, Hong Kong, India, and Japan), Latin America (including Brazil
and Mexico), the United States and Canada. Although the dataset lacks observations from some
countries such as the African ones, we still cover a broad range of observations from both
developing and developed countries. There are different "classifications of countries to
institutional systems" for board female presence (Grosvold & Brammer, 2011: 124) and our
sample has observations from at least one country in each of these classifications.
Bloomberg has available data for many countries, but we had the following set of criteria for
a country to be included in our sample. First, the country should have a reporting requirement for
public companies to provide financial and board-level data. Moreover, since the number of public
firms is different in different countries, and some countries have only a few firms, we set a
minimum of 30 firm-year observations as the generally-accepted threshold for regression. Finally,
our sample should represent a geographically and institutionally diverse set of countries to allow
for variation. This screening method is mainly consistent with Grosvold, Rayton, and Brammer’s
(2016) study.
The number of publicly-traded companies varies markedly across countries. For example, the
number of listed companies in the US is more than 60 times this number in countries such as

16

Finland. This can overweight the impact of some countries and downplay others. To deal with this
issue, our approach was to randomly select a sample of each country in such a way that their
representation in the final sample is corresponding to the GDP percentage of that country in the
world with a ±2.5% threshold. Therefore, we present a sample that fits well with the globalrepresentation of different countries. Table 1.1 shows the number and percentage of our final firmyear observations per country.
In the initial sample, there were missing values, and some of the firms were duplicated due to
cross-listing. We deleted those firms that their country of domicile (the country where major
management activities take place) was different from the country of listing to avoid multiple
national logics for one firm. The remaining sample consists of 835 firms and an unbalanced panel
data set of 1,689 firm-years observations (n = 835, T = 1-7, N = 1689) for 17 countries from 2012
to 2018. Databases we used are Bloomberg, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), and Hofstede Insights.
[Insert Table 1.1 about here]
3.2. Dependent variable:
3.2.1. Board Female Representation Under-conformity refers to “intentional behaviors that
depart from the norms of a referent group” (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004: 828) for board female
representation. To measure deviance, first, we calculate female representation using the percentage
of female members on the board. Previous scholars have widely used this method (e.g., Grosvold,
& Brammer, 2011; Terjesen and Singh, 2008). Then, we calculate the mean score of each industry
within a specific country. We differentiate among industries because different industries have
different patterns for gender diversity (e.g., Terjesen et al. 2009). We use the two-digit SIC code
to define industries. To measure the mean, we include every observation that has data for gender
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diversity, even those with missing values for other variables: the more data, the more precise index
for female representation. In the next step, we calculate the difference between the board female
percentage of each firm and the mean to measure deviance. This method is consistent with the
previous studies (e.g., Deephouse, 1999; Miller & Chen, 1996; Walls & Hoffman, 2013). Finally,
we define a dummy variable in which any negative deviance, i.e., score below the mean, is 1 and
the rest is 0.
3.3. Independent variables:
3.3.1. Entrepreneurial Orientation has been long measured based on instruments that were
developed decades ago. Time has come for the field to use complementary measurement
approaches to the well-established psychometric approach advanced by Covin and Slevin (1989)
for assessing EO (Wales, 2016). One such alternative measurement approach is using more
objective, secondary measurement indicators that provide insight into EO behavior (Miller, 2011).
Miller and Breton–Miller’s (2011) method represents a highly useful step toward the goal of
advancing alternative operationalizations of EO (Wales, 2016). In line with this method, we
measure innovativeness as “research and development expenses divided by total sales,”
proactiveness as “the percentage of annual earnings reinvested within the company” or retention
ratio, and risk-taking as “the risk of a price change in firm market value due to firm-specific
circumstances.” This risk is called unsystematic or idiosyncratic risk and is “derived by regressing
firm-specific return on a value-weighted return of the market as a whole, and retaining the root
mean square error from the regression” (Miller & Breton–Miller, 2011: 1062).
To measure the idiosyncratic risk of each firm, we do a regression between the monthly
returns of the firm and the market. The return of firm i is driven by a common factor and the firm-
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specific shock 𝜀 i. To capture risk, we use the traditional CAPM formula, in which Ri,t is the return
of firm i, Rm,t is the market return, Rf,t is the risk-free return and 𝜀 i,t is the idiosyncratic return.
Ri,t - Rf,t = 𝛽i,t (Rm,t - rf,t)+ 𝜀 i,t
We measure the idiosyncratic volatility of firm with the standard deviation of the residuals
as follow:
Risk-Taking= IVOLi,t= 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀 , )
We used the summative (formative) measure for EO by using the three components of that.
These components may vary independently (Lyon, Lumpkin & Dess, 2000), and this justifies using
the summative rather than a reflective index (Miller & Breton–Miller’s, 2011). Variables are
standardized in the summative measure of EO.
Entrepreneurial Orientation=
(
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3.3.2. Slack Resource refers to the overall organizational capital that can be redeployed to achieve
organizational goals (George, 2005; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Free cash flow is used as the proxy
of financial slack. This proxy is widely used in the literature (e.g., Cardoso, Martinez & Teixeira,
2014). To make sure that slack can affect governance capacity and to improve the causality, the
firm’s slack is lagged by one year.
3.3.3. The extent of Regulatory Enforcement refers to the national level intensity of monitoring
and penalizing illegal organizational actions (Banerjee, 2011). We captured the extent of
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regulatory enforcement using data from the World Bank database. This index varies from -2.5, as
the weakest to +2.5, as the strongest score for country regulatory enforcement in each country.
3.4. Control variables:
We include several control variables that have been shown in the previous studies to impact board
gender diversity. Firm Size: The likelihood of female representation on board is correlated with
firm size (Hillman et al., 2007). To measure firm size, we use the natural logarithm of the number
of employees. Firm Performance: Studies show a relationship between performance and women
on board (e.g., Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Post & Byron, 2015; Ryan & Haslam, 2007).
We use the previous performance (t-1) measured with the net profit divided by total equity (ROE).
Female CEO: Based on the literature female CEO and board gender diversity are associated (AlMamun, Yasser, Entebang, Nathan & Rahman, 2013). We use a dummy variable that is coded as
1 when there is a female CEO. CEO Duality: CEO duality has the potential to impact board gender
diversity (Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013) To account for this impact, we control whether the CEO also
chairs the board coded as 1. Board Independence: Board independence can also impact female
representation on board (Geiger & Marlin, 2012). We measure it by using the percentage of
outsiders on the board. Social Culture (Power Distance, Masculinity): Previous studies argue that
only certain aspects of culture (power distance and masculinity) contribute to the level of gender
diversity (Carrasco, Francoeur, Labelle, Laffarga & Ruiz-Barbadillo, 2015). Consistently we
control for these dimensions. Data for culture is obtained from the Hofstede Insights database.
Gender Inequality: Firms operating in countries with lower gender inequalities have a higher
likelihood of having women on board (Fernandez‐Feijoo, Romero & Ruiz‐Blanco, 2014), This
index, obtained from UNDP database (Human Development Report, 2019)
3.5. Analysis and Results:

20

Since our dataset includes multiple observations for firms across different years, we used the
generalized estimating equations technique to avoid autocorrelation among the within-group
observations. Generalized estimating equations (GEE) are suitable for handling panel data
(Ballinger, 2004).
[Insert Table 1.2 about here]
[Insert Table 1.3 about here]
The descriptive statistics of all variables and pairwise correlation for the sampled firms are
shown in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3. Consistent with our expectation, the correlation between
entrepreneurial orientation and under-conformity is significant (0.121). As a result higher
entrepreneurial orientation is associated with lower conformity to board female representation
norms. Table 1.4 displays the results of the generalized estimating equations. Model 1 shows an
analysis with only control variables. The unstandardized coefficient of EO is positive when it is
added in Model 2. Consistent with our expectation, the model shows a strong significant positive
relationship between EO and under-conformity (𝛽= 0.116, SE= 0.0318, P< .001). These results
support hypothesis 1 and corroborate our expectation that firms with higher entrepreneurial
orientation are more likely to go below the national norms.
[Insert Table 1.4 about here]
In Model 3, EO interacts with slack resources to test hypothesis 2. Once again, the model
indicates a significant moderating impact. According to the results, the interaction term is negative
and significant (𝛽= -0.304, SE= 0.129, P< .05), which provide empirical support for hypothesis 2.
In Model 4, we test for the hypothesis that EO interacts with the extent of regulatory enforcement.
The model shows an insignificant interaction, hence, we did not find empirical support for
hypothesis 3. Finally, Model 5 shows the whole variables, which include control variables in
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addition to the independent variables and the two moderators. In general, the results confirm the
significant moderating impact of slack resources, however the same cannot be said for the
regulatory enforcement.
3.6. Robustness Tests
First, as an alternative measure for under-conformity, a dummy variable is defined, in which
anything that is one standard deviation below the mean has been considered as under-conformity
to the norm. This is an examination of the more extreme outliers of under-conformity. The results
in Table 1.5 show that there is a significant positive relationship between entrepreneurial
orientation and under-conformity. Hence, our results are robust for any under-conformity but also
for extreme levels of under-conformity.
[Insert Table 1.5 about here]
As another measure, we focus on the sub-sample in which board female representation is
below the mean and explore the relationship between EO and continuous measure of underconformity. The results show that the more entrepreneurial orientation the more underconformance to institutional logic. Hence, our results are robust for both categorical as well as
continuous measures of under-conformity.
Second, to decrease causality concerns, we lagged the independent variable (EO) by one
year to better test our causal assumptions. The result confirms the impact of entrepreneurial
orientation on the board female representation under-conformity. Furthermore, one might argue
that the findings are due to the board size deviation and not the deviation in the number of women
on board. The percentage of women on the board is calculated by dividing the number of women
by board size. To decrease the concern that the results are affected by the impact of board size
variable, i.e., the denominator, we re-run analyses for testing the deviation of board size. The same
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procedure to calculate board gender diversity under-conformity is applied for board size underconformity. The result reduces the concern that the link is due to board size impact.
4. DISCUSSION
This study explored the variation in board gender diversity between and across national
governance environments. While board gender composition has garnered significant interest
(Kirsch, 2018), deviance from a dominant national institutional logic is an unexplored avenue in
comparative gender diversity literature. Consistent with corporate governance deviance theory
(Aguilera et al., 2018) and gender role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), we found that a
firm high in risk-taking, innovativeness and proactiveness as represented by entrepreneurial
orientation is more likely to deviate below institutional logic for board female representation.
These findings are consistent with the underrepresentation of women in high-tech industries (Vigo,
2019).
Our findings also revealed a boundary condition and showed that when the amount of slack
in the firm is high, the impact of EO on under-conformity reduces. This is consistent with the
behavioral theory (Cyert & March, 1963), which argues that slack creates organizational passivity
and decreases the motivation for novelty and distinctiveness. Having a high amount of slack
hinders the three stages of deviant behavior including awareness, accessibility, and activation
(Thornton et al., 2012). It appears to discourage the search for alternative courses of action, which
can finally decrease the latitude of action and result in the actual misfit between the firm's practices
and national logic. Indeed, our findings showed that slack resources function as an “inertia” and
“complacency-fostering buffer” (Sitkin, et al., 2011) to deter deviant behavior.
While CGDT argues for the strengthening impact of governance capacity on the link
between EO and nonconformity, we showed that this impact might be contingent on the type of
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governance capacity. In our study, financial slack resources as a kind of governance capacity
weakened the impact of EO on deviance. This negative moderation is not in line with CGDT
prediction and sheds light on the potential contingency nature of governance capacity.
Contrary to our expectation, we did not find a significant impact of regulatory enforcement
on the link between EO and under-conformity. This insignificant result is potentially due to the
multiplicity of regulatory policies to overcome the gender imbalance (Senden, 2014) and the
relatively non-mature nature of gender quota regulation. In other words, the type of regulation
may matter more than overall extent of regulatory enforcement. As such, this finding also
contributes to our understanding of CGDT as well.

4.1. Theoretical Implications
Using corporate governance deviance theory to explain institutional nonconformity to board
female representation logic, we respond to the call for more research on the impact of
organizational identity on strategic responses to institutional processes (Durand & Thornton,
2018). Given the popularity of board gender composition, particularly in comparative corporate
governance literature (Knippen et al., 2019), and growing attention to the organizational agency
(Saka-Helmhout, 2020), the intersection of these two provides a ground that is of interest for
scholars of both institutional theory and corporate governance field.
Contribution to gender diversity literature: While current limited yet growing studies on
the antecedents of female representation (Guldiken et al., 2018; Hillman et al., 2007) focuses on
either institutional factors or organizational factors, we advance the literature by bringing the
organizational agency into the study of institutional processes for board gender composition.
Doing so, we overcome the inability of previous studies to explain the variation of governance
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practices within a country (García‐Castro, Aguilera & Ariño, 2013) for female presence. Board
female representation has mainly taken as exogenous (Hillman et al., 2007). This study is one of
the few that explore the antecedent of female representation with a key difference. The micro and
macro level antecedents have evolved separately in the literature and no study has linked these two
levels together. By linking national logic and organizational level factors to better explain
organizational behavior, we contribute to the comparative gender diversity literature. In general,
our findings suggest the entrepreneurial orientation of the firm as an underlying explanation of
why some firms go below the national norm for board female presence.
Moreover, the literature on the antecedent of board female representation suffers from the
paucity of theory and needs finer-grained researches (Terjesen et al. 2009). The majority of current
studies are descriptive and do not have a sound theoretical foundation. Bringing the CGDT and
GRCT into the field contributes to board gender diversity literature and helps to a better
explanation of board gender composition. Finally, our study provides a global perspective on board
gender diversity that is unique to the literature. The few studies that examine board gender diversity
in a global context (e.g., Grosvold & Brammer, 2011, Grosvold et al., 2016; Terjesen & Singh,
2008; Terjesen et al., 2015) focus on the average board female presence across countries. Using a
globally-representative set of firms, our study moves away from the average and consider
distribution within each country.
Contribution to corporate governance deviance theory: This study also extends and refines
the corporate governance deviance theory (Aguilera et al., 2018). First, this is one of the initial
attempts to respond the call for an empirical test of the theory (Aguilera et al., 2018) and provides
strong support for this recent conceptual advance in the context of the board of directors, which is
a unique and central part of governance mechanism (Daily et al., 2003; Walls & Hoffman, 2013).
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Particularly, board gender composition is one of the most visible attributes of firms (Lynall et al.,
2003) and is highly influenced by societal norms (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). As a result, it is a
suitable field to examine institutional deviance. Second, we show the potential contingency nature
of governance capacity, as the moderator of the corporate governance deviance model.
As opposed to CGDT predictions, financial slack resources as a kind of governance
capacity was found to weaken the impact of EO on deviance. While this result confirms the
moderating impact of governance capacity, it calls into question the direction. Further researches
might shed light on the contingency nature of governance capacity. Third, we probe into the type
of deviance and argue the direction of nonconformity. Deviation from norms can take place by
either going below the norm, i.e. under-conformity or exceeding the norm, i.e., over-conformity
(Heckert & Heckert, 2002). While CGDT differentiates between these two, it does not provide
insight into predicting firm behavior as regard to deviance direction. In this study, we argue that
firms with EO are more likely to deviate below norms for board female representation given the
gender role congruity impact (Eagly & Karau, 2002). A similar approach can be used for other
governance practices and other complementary theories to describe the direction of the
nonconformity of firms with EO.
Contribution to entrepreneurship literature: Little is known about the board gender
composition of firms with entrepreneurial orientation. One notable exception is the study of Kroll,
Walters and Le (2007), in which suitable post-IPO board composition of entrepreneurial firms is
explored. Our multilevel study suggests that firms with entrepreneurial orientation have lower
board female representation than the average of the institutional context in which they operate.
Several authors have suggested the benefit of conducting multi-level research in the EO domain
(Wales, 2016). Institutional logics considerations contribute to the field and help to a better
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explanation of governance preferences of a firm with EO, particularly their board compositions.
Moreover, there has been limited knowledge of the causal mechanisms in EO–performance
relationships (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). There is a need for theory integration in the field to
explain mediating influences in EO-performance relationships (Wales, 2016). Although we do not
examine performance, our study introduces a potential mediation that can shed light on this link.
Given the significance of female representation in institutional context (Lynall et al., 2003; Zajac
& Westphal, 1996) and the performance implications of deviance from institutional logics
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Garg, 2013; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) deviation below the board
female representation logic can impact the organizational performance of the firm with EO.

4.2. Practical Implications
The benefits of board gender diversity are manifold. It enforces ethical behavior, increases
transparency, and improves corporate governance (e.g., Gul, Srinidhi & Ng, 2011). Despite the
recent attempts to improve female presence on public corporate boards, there is still a notable
imbalanced gender representation (e.g., Strøm, 2019; Zhang, 2012). There is a need for studies
that bolster our understanding of how and why firms respond differently to board female
representation logic. To push for better representation of women on board, policymakers need to
know which firms tend to deviate from normative prescriptions. It is particularly important to pay
attention to the under-conformity behavior of firms with entrepreneurial identity. Because these
firms have the potential to trigger institutional change through establishing a new set of norms
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), which can counteract the institutional attempts to balance gender
representation. Moreover, our findings have clear implications for female board candidates to
make them more informed about the distribution of female presence within the institution. Our
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findings represent opportunity areas for women trying to advance to the corporate elite and reach
to key organizational positions.

5. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has some limitations that can provide directions for future research. First, the proxy we
used for entrepreneurial orientation is crude and only captures the external manifestation of EO.
Despite the high reliability of such archival measures for EO, even the best, most-often used
measures may suffer from construct validity concerns (Lyon et al., 2000). This operationalization
does not fully capture the concept of EO, nor overall entrepreneurial identify. Future studies can
use a measurement that is more richly characterized (for a review see Wales, 2016).
Second, it is important not to overgeneralize our findings that come from a sample of
publicly-traded firms. The significance of institutional conformity may not be the same for private
firms, which have less public scrutiny around their governance practices. There is an opportunity
for scholars to examine board composition in other settings, such as family firms or non-profit
organizations.
Third, we did not take into account the performance implications of under-conformity for
board female representation. The deviation can impact organizational outcomes, however, there is
an ongoing debate on the type of impact (Carpenter, 2000). Future research would benefit from
studying how departure from the national norms of gender diversity can impact firm performance
for different versions of nonconformity (Heckert & Heckert, 2002).
A fourth and final limitation is that we assume that women, once on the board, are speaking
up and influencing deliberations. However, membership on the board doesn’t always lead to a
contribution to boardroom deliberations (e.g., Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007). In-depth field studies
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are required to overcome this limitation. Additionally, we did not differentiate women’s presence
in different board committees. A more detailed research design can be applied to explain female
representation patterns in various committees. Future research can also explore female
representation patterns for TMT or CEO positions.
5.1. Conclusions
Despite these limitations, our findings contribute to a global perspective on board gender
diversity and explain the variation of female representation within a national context, which is
unexplored in the literature. This study is the first global study to provide a more theory-based and
nuanced perspective on why some firms conform to institutional norms, while others underconform to these norms for board female representation.
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TABLE 1.1
Number and Percentage of Firm-Years Observations per Country for 2012-2018
Country

% Global
GDP

Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
Finland
France
Germany
Hong Kong
India
Japan
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

1.8
2.7
2.3
14
0.4
3.4
5
0.7
2.7
6.7
1.7
1.2
0.7
0.8
0.99
3.99
24.1

Number of
Firm-Years

% of Firm-Years

56
3.31
16
0.94
55
3.25
280
16.57
37
2.19
97
5.74
128
7.57
55
3.25
33
1.95
116
6.86
55
3.25
60
3.55
25
1.48
56
3.31
60
3.55
110
6.51
450
26.64
Unbalanced Panel: n = 835, T = 1-7, N = 1689

Difference between % Global
GDP & % Representation in
the Sample
1.5
-1.7
0.9
2.5
1.7
2.3
2.5
2.5
-0.7
0.1
1.5
2.3
0.7
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
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TABLE 1.2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Under-Conformity
EO
Innovativeness
Proactiveness
Risk Taking
Regulatory Enforcement
Slack
Firm Size
Performance
Female CEO
Duality
Board Independence
Power Distance
Masculinity
Gender Inequality

Mean
.453
-.722
.028
.633
.071
1.205
.229
9.301
.16
.042
.261
.629
.511
.587
.161

Std.Dev.
.498
1.849
.048
.264
.047
.885
1.26
1.951
.188
.202
.439
.237
.183
.191
.092

Std.Err.
.0123
.0458
.0012
.007
.0012
.0219
.0312
.0483
.0047
.0050
.0109
.590
.453
.473
.002

[95%_Conf
.4284982
-.8117885
.0261206
.6200365
.068366
1.16218
.1677006
9.206288
.1505303
.0325868
.2396990
.6177211
.5029241
.5781490
.1562428

Interval]
.4769072
-.6319958
.0307916
.6457352
.0728937
1.248213
.2901556
9.395932
.1688551
.0521798
.2824140
.6408471
.5206870
.5967033
.1651577
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TABLE 1.3
Pairwise Correlation
Variables
(1) Under-conformity
(2) EO
(3) Innovativeness
(4) Proactiveness
(5) Risk Taking
(6) Regulatory Enforcement
(7) Slack
(8) Firm Size
(9) Performance
(10) Female CEO
(11) Duality
(12) Board Independence
(13) Power Distance
(14) Masculinity
(15) Gender Inequality

(1)
1.000
0.121*
0.050*
0.108*
0.073*
0.009
-0.039
-0.112*
-0.087*
-0.136*
-0.026
0.039
-0.023
-0.115*
0.002

* shows significance at the 0.05 level

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

1.000
0.444*
0.735*
0.738*
-0.166*
0.034
-0.380*
-0.120*
0.004
0.075*
-0.043
0.103*
0.169*
0.154*

1.000
0.062*
0.016
-0.002
0.044
-0.059*
-0.020
-0.010
-0.016
0.067*
-0.026
0.010
-0.131*

1.000
0.291*
-0.080*
-0.011
-0.275*
-0.128*
-0.019
0.109*
0.022
0.023
0.173*
0.207*

1.000
-0.213*
0.039
-0.361*
-0.075*
0.032
0.039
-0.143*
0.176*
0.124*
0.165*

1.000
-0.021
0.018
0.046
-0.008
-0.026
0.551*
-0.890*
-0.275*
-0.429*

1.000
-0.077*
0.014
0.045
-0.011
-0.027
0.019
0.022
-0.017

1.000
0.042
-0.086*
-0.119*
0.043
0.054*
-0.113*
-0.127*

1.000
0.102*
-0.043
0.023
-0.078*
-0.029
0.057*

1.000
-0.000
-0.045
0.006
0.011
0.039

1.000
-0.110*
0.116*
0.196*
0.096*

1.000
-0.665*
-0.338*
-0.117*

1.000
0.262*
0.405*

1.000
0.272*

1.000
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TABLE 1.4
GEE regression analysis predicting board female representation under-conformity
Variable

Model 1
SE
𝛽
2.145***
.476
-.146***
.0277
-.927**
.321
-1.845***
.366
-.105
.120
.00125
.315
.0555
.432
-1.53***
.304
.764
.665

Constant
Firm Size
Firm Performance t-1
Female CEO
Duality
Board Independence
Power Distance
Masculinity
Gender Inequality
EO
EO* Slack
Slack
EO* Regulatory
Enforcement
Regulatory
Enforcement
Chi2
82.74
† p = 0.1 * p = 0.05, ** p = 0.01, *** p = 0.001

Model 2
SE
𝛽
2.071***
.478
.106***
.0299
-.814*
.322
-1.846*** .367
-.103
.120
-.0924
.317
-.0957
.435
-1.67***
.308
.671
.670
.116***
.0318

Model 3
SE
𝛽
1.942***
.480
-.0892**
.0304
-.816*
.323
-1.855***
.367
-.125
.121
-.188
.322
-.223
.438
-1.59***
.313
.804
.674
.106**
.0324
-.304*
.129
-.663**
.252

Model 4
SE
𝛽
2.208*** .682
-.107***
.0302
-.824*
.322
-1.858*** .368
-.0945
.124
-.0973
.319
-.278
.740
-1.66***
.312
.730
.691
.136**
.0501

Model 5
SE
𝛽
1.943***
.687
-.0914**
.0306
-.826*
.323
-1.880*** .368
-.124
.124
-.180
.323
-.259
.740
-1.56***
.316
.964
.696
.145**
.0494
-.330*
.131
-707**
.259

-.0182

-.0368

-.0471
94.43

97.71

.0344
.136
94.79

-.0198

.0349
.137
98.38
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TABLE 1.5
GEE regression analysis predicting board female representation under-conformity with an alternative measure (STD below the mean)
Variable

Model 1
SE
𝛽
-1.726*
.738
-.246***
.0334
-1.148**
.404
-.0760
.144
-.149
.448
2.16***
.552
2.35***
.533
2.540**
.776

Constant
Firm Size
Firm Performance t-1
Duality
Board Independence
Power Distance
Masculinity
Gender Inequality
EO
EO* Slack
Slack
EO* Regulatory
Enforcement
Regulatory
Enforcement
Chi2
157.3
† p = 0.1 * p = 0.05, ** p = 0.01, *** p = 0.001

Model 2
SE
𝛽
-1.805*
.744
-.214***
.0356
-1.018*
.400
-.0664
.144
-.240
.452
2.05***
.554
2.26***
.538
2.482**
.778
.0929*
.0363

Model 3
SE
𝛽
-1.855*
.750
-.214***
.0365
-.973*
.399
-.0676
.145
-.186
.456
2.10***
.559
2.18***
.548
2.555**
.780
.0911*
.0366
-.183†
.105
-.181
.144

Model 4
SE
𝛽
-.641
1.043
-.194***
.0362
-1.016*
.405
-.0136
.147
-.445
.462
.663
1.07
2.04***
.540
2.039*
.797
.0112
.0490

Model 5
SE
𝛽
-.631
1.053
-.198***
.0370
-.983*
.404
-.0111
.148
-.390
.465
.684
1.07
1.96***
.549
2.102*
.804
.0131
.0510
-.154
.109
-.135
.147

.0877*

.0812*

-.245
161.7

164.4

.0371
.177
168.1

-.255

.0380
.178
170.4
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CHAPTER 2
DOES IT PAY TO EXCEED INSTITUTIONAL EXPECTATIONS FOR FEMALE
REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS? A DEVIANT GENDER ROLE
THEORY PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT
Previous studies acknowledge the importance of isomorphic institutional norms to explain
performance implications of the gender profiles of board of directors, leaving the variation within
the same national or industry context unexplored. Building on insights from resource dependence
theory, we examine whether and how deviating above the industry norms (i.e., over-conformity)
for female representation on boardrooms has different performance consequences for firms,
depending on the stakeholder group influenced. Specifically, we find that accounting performance
is reinforced as perceived by the managers and employees within the firm; market performance is
unaffected as perceived by shareholders, and innovation performance is decreased as perceived by
innovation resource providers. Hence, the performance effect of over-conformity depends on the
stakeholder group considered. Overall, we contribute to resource dependence theory by
emphasizing the role of various stakeholders in valuation of women’s presence. Moreover, this
study extends our understanding of the boundary conditions for value creation by female directors
by focusing on corporate governance deviance literature.
Keywords: Non-Conformity, Resource dependence theory, Positive Deviance, Board Female
Representation, Gender Role Theory, Institutional Logics.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Due to historical under-representation of women on corporate boards, there are increasing attempts
by policymakers to encourage gender equality in boardrooms. These policies are mainly derived
by growing evidence suggesting that female representation brings numerous desirable
organizational outcomes. These outcomes include, but are not limited to, higher accounting
performance (Abdullah, Ismail, & Nachum, 2016; Singh, Vinnicombe & Johnson, 2001), better
market performance (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2010), and improved social responsibility
behaviors (Boulouta, 2013). Evidence shows that large diversity-promoting firms have
experienced abnormal positive returns on the date of female director announcement (Ellis & Keys,
2003). In addition, there is increasing recognition that women are often blocked from C-suite and
board-level positions due to the glass ceiling (Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2020). Hence, there is
also a moral argument that it is more fair to have more women serving on corporate boards.
While most firms choose to conform with institutional norms, others seek to go beyond
these norms (i.e., over-conformity) with the hope to gain more legitimacy. However, deviating
from the prevailing institutional logic can result in unique costs and benefits based on different
perspectives leaving practitioners and policy-makers unsure about the performance implications
of board female representation exceeding institutional norms. The reasoning of institutionalists
argues in favor of conforming behavior; however, the competitive analysis perspective discusses
that non-conformity can enhance firm performance by bypassing traditional practices and
providing a competitive advantage through differentiation (Miller, Breton-Miller & Lester, 2013).
While normative (objective) conceptions ignore deviance admiration, reactivist (subjective)
definitions of deviance, view over-conformity as positively evaluated behaviors. Indeed, Heckert
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and Heckert (2002) integrate these two perspectives to underscore the role of various stakeholders
in evaluating institutional responses.
Further, mixed findings associated with women’s presence complicate assessing
consequences of non-conformity to board female representation logic. Despite numerous research
studies suggesting benefits with board female representation, there are also many studies showing
that it can have a negative impact on organizational outcomes, including the accounting
performance (Mínguez-Vera & Martin, 2011) or stockholders' value (Bennouri, Chtioui, Nagati &
Nekhili, 2018; Bøhren & Strøm, 2010). These contradictory findings coupled with increasing calls
from external stakeholders to enhance female representation create a lot of ambiguity for
managers. In sum, the equivocal position of literature for the performance implications of deviant
institutional responses makes understanding whether and how over-conformity to board female
representation logic can yield systematic firm performance outcomes a vitally important practical
matter.
Deviance from institutional norms has been widely examined in strategy research, and
previous studies acknowledge that organizations are subject to institutional norms, however, the
key implications of this behavior are largely underexplored (Philippe & Durand, 2011; Bascle,
2016), particularly with respect to gender diversity research. Moreover, the concept of overconformity is marginalized in deviance literature, which mainly focuses on going below the norm
(i.e. under-conformity) as the non-conformity behavior (Heckert & Heckert, 2002).
The complexity of the relationship between female board presence and performance as
well as the impact of institutional logic on this link speaks of the need for more nuanced
consideration (Post & Byron, 2015). The outcomes created by female directors rest on two
arguments, which both are affected by institutional context (Abdullah et al., 2016; Terjesen &
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Singh, 2008). First, women view themselves and behave differently than men (Barbulescu &
Bidwell, 2013). Second, women are perceived differently than men by stakeholders (Ryan &
Haslam, 2007). Accordingly, a vast body of literature examines the institutional factors that drive
corporate governance practices, specifically firms' choice for board female representation (e.g,
Terjesen, Aguilera & Lorenz, 2015). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that
directly explores the various performance implications of exceeding institutional norms.
In this study, we develop our theory in the context of multiple industries in the USA and
consider three different aspects of firm performance to better understand the performance
implications of female board representation. We argue the performance largely depends on the
stakeholder perception of the over-conformity and hence, varies significantly with the type of
performance considered. We believe this is the first study to theoretically and empirically examine
the relationship between the organizational response to board female representation overconformity and the performance in various formats.
We develop a concept of female representation deviance that extends the existing studies
of value creation of female directors in three ways. First, we distinguish between the impact of
female directors for those firms that conform to and those who deviate from the institutional logic
for female representation. Second, we differentiate between the types of deviation and focus on a
less explored non-conformity behavior referred to as over-conformity. Third, we take the position
that firm performance has different indicators and the influence of female directors might vary
depending on the type of performance considered (i.e., accounting, market, or innovation). In
addition, we contribute to resource dependence theory, which argues that board of director
members provide resources that can change power in and around organizations and environmental
dependencies through linking the firm to external agencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). We argue
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that this effect is perceived differently with different stakeholders (i.e., managers and employees,
shareholders, and resource providers) dealing with female directors.
2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
There is a long-standing interest in the study of conformity to institutional norms, i.e., socially
constructed values, beliefs, rules, and practices (Thornton & Ocasio 1999) in organizational theory
research (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Institutional theorists believe that
adopting practices that meet institutional demands results in higher legitimacy. This is necessarily
important for firm practices that are broadly noticed such as board composition (Lynall, Golden &
Hillman, 2003). Firms with higher levels of legitimacy have better access to resources
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011), more support from stakeholders
(e.g., Choi & Shepherd, 2005), and better funding from investors (e.g., Cohen & Dean, 2005).
Unusual governance practices can make stakeholders suspicious about the firm, and firms violating
the norms risk punishment.
On the other hand, deviant behavior provides a chance to seize new competitive
opportunities in order to improve performance (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Deviant behavior
is associated with novelty and distinctiveness and is a type of aggressive behavior that can
differentiate the firm. Firms that deviate from corporate governance norms are expected to possess
an entrepreneurial identity that helps them take on relatively radical initiatives (Aguilera, Judge &
Terjesen, 2018). For example, there are some arguments that firms can only enhance total
shareholder returns by competing aggressively. Consequently, being entrepreneurially aggressive
is expected to entail risk-taking, proactive initiative, and pioneering innovation. This logic suggests
that investors recognize distinctive behavior and will put a premium on the market values of firms
that exhibit more entrepreneurial orientation.
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In addition to the difference between conformity and non-conformity of gender
representation on the board, the distinction between the type of non-conformity (i.e., under- and
over-conformity) needs to be considered. Unfortunately, the literature has paid little attention to
over-conformity (Heckert & Heckert, 2002). Traditionally deviation was mainly equivalent to
under-conformity and was evaluated negatively (e.g., Robinson & Bennett, 1995), but more recent
studies have suggested that deviation is a broad concept, and deviance admiration is not only
possible but likely (e.g., Vadera, Pratt & Mishra, 2013; Warren, 2003). Heckert and Heckert (2002)
divide social reactions to over-conformity into rate-busting (over-conforming to norms associated
with negative evaluations), and positive deviance (over-conforming to norms associated with
positive evaluations). These different evaluations show that not only conformity and nonconformity have different consequences, but the type of non-conformity can make changes and
needs nuances consideration.
The consequences of conformity to norms can increase with the importance of that norm.
We expect conformity with female representation to be important because it meets at least four out
of the six criteria that Bascle (2016) mentions to determine a norm’s importance; (1) board female
representation is calculable, (2) it relates to other social dimensions (such as gender equality and
minority empowerment policies), (3) powerful parties (usually governments and social agencies)
support it, and (4) it is more prescriptive than proscriptive (firms are encouraged to increase the
presence of women on board). Therefore, we expect that conformity to board female representation
to elicit a relatively strong stakeholder reaction that is easily observed and valued differentially.
Despite the benefits of conformity, many firms deviate from the dominant institutional
logic because they usually face multiple logics that can conflict with each other. Deviation from
board female representation norm is not uncommon given the mixed evidence for the performance
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implications of board female representation, which ranges from a positive accounting performance
or market reaction (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2010; Singh et al., 2001), to negative accounting
performance or stockholders value (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Bennouri et al., 2018; Bøhren &
Strøm, 2010) to non-existent link (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010).
Furthermore, the strategic management literature has recently started to pay attention to the
differential impacts of female representation on firm performance depending on the construct
utilized (Abdullah et al., 2016). “A broader conceptualization of business performance would
include emphasis on indicators of operational performance (i.e., nonfinancial) in addition to
indicators of financial performance” (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986: p804). At the financial
level, accounting performance indicates how the gendered board actually performs historically,
while market performance mainly indicates how the gendered board is expected to perform in the
future. At the operational level, performance outcomes, such as firm innovativeness, reveal how
functional excellence is achieved within the firm. Having both financial and non-financial
constructs provides a better understanding of the impact of over-conformity accommodating the
contextualized nature of non-conformity.
In this study, we take insights from resource dependence theory to explain how female
representation over-conformity influences various performance outcomes. Resource dependence
theory (RDT) focuses on the importance of resources—including human resources— to change
the power within organizations and manage the environments (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Drawing
from RDT, we identify the role of women in resource provision to affect firm behavior. Central to
RDT is the concept of power or control over vital resources (for a review please see Hillman,
Withers & Collins, 2009). Boards enable firms to obtain resources and minimize dependence
(Pfeffer, 1972) and RDT is one of the most successful lenses for understanding board (Hillman et
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al., 2009). RDT acknowledges that board composition is not random but a response to the condition
in the external environment (Pfeffer, 1972). Board composition should match the resources
provided by the board with the need of the organization.
RDT is a key determinant of board composition (Daily & Schwenk, 1996). While the RDT
traditionally assumes that board composition should focus on resource-rich directors for higher
performance (Hillman et al., 2009), we relax this assumption in this study. Specifically, we argue
that female representation can be valued differently by different stakeholder groups, and therefore,
the performance metric that focuses on different stakeholder groups will vary by metric. Taken
together we identify the importance of audience in evaluating board female representation overconformity as a source of variation in performance. Moreover, we argue that the impact of
resources that directors bring into the boardroom on the firm might vary considering organizational
response to institutional logic. For example, one of the benefits directors bring to organizations is
legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), however, after reaching the institutional norm, the
additional legitimacy, and hence value of those resources can change.
2.1. Board Gender Diversity Relative to Institutional Norms
While there is a global societal demand for increasing board gender diversity, particularly
in recent decades, there is notable variation across countries. For example, while in the U.S. the
percentage of board seats held by women reached all-time high (about 27%) for S&P500 in 2019
(ISS Analytics), in countries such as Japan, female representation is meager. Previous scholars
have identified a variety of national systems to explain the national logic for female representation
and cluster countries (e.g., Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; Terjesen and Singh, 2008).
According to Grosvold and Brammer’s (2011) study, from an economic perspective, liberal
market economies have a larger share of women on boards compared to coordinated market
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economies, which are more suited to the male-model of full-time employment. From a national
business system perspective, the compartmentalized system places more focus on general skills
rather than promotion structure (Whitley, 1992) in favor of women, who have less history in firms.
From a legal perspective, the English origin legal system supports higher gender diversity. Finally,
from a cultural perspective, women’s presence in the Anglo system is less than Nordic or Eastern
European cultures. In sum, there is a clear difference in female representation across countries due
to the various national norms (e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Iannotta, Gatti, & Huse, 2016;
Marquardt & Wiedman, 2016). As much as national differences, in some countries such as the
USA, there are also regional differences driving within-country differences (Terjesen, Sealy &
Singh, 2009).
In addition to the national and regional level factors, board gender composition can also
vary depending on its industry context (e.g., Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003; Cumming, Leung
& Rui, 2015). While firms in the banking and finance sectors have male-dominant boards of
directors, "some industries, such as food processing, clothing (textile, garment) manufacturing,
medicine, and biological product manufacturing, the retail clothing trade, food and beverage
services, hotels, tourism, radio, film and television, and publishing, have been characterized as
female-dominated" (Cumming et al., 2015: 1576). Likewise, female representation in non-profit
sectors is also more than in for-profit ones (Terjesen et al. 2009). The industry impacts women’s
opportunity to advance to top organizational levels (McCormick Hyland & Marcellino, 2002),
therefore changes female presence in corporate boards.
The institutional logic can determine the performance consequences of board female
representation (Terjesen & Singh, 2008). Previous studies acknowledge that the impact of board
female presence on organizational outcomes depends on the institutional context (Abdullah et al.,
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2016; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). For example, in emerging economies, due to more negative views
of women shaped by deep-seated unfavorable attitudes toward women in power, the participation
of women on board has a negative impact on market performance (Abdullah et al., 2016).
Nevertheless, not all firms within the same institutional context are the same. While the
traditional focus of institutional literature was on isomorphism, neo-institutionalism pays more
attention to the variety of organizations' responses to the institutional logic and considers agentic
behavior (Heugens & Lander, 2009; Powell & DiMaggio, 2012). Confirming that deviant behavior
is not uncommon, corporate governance deviance theory argues that firms with entrepreneurial
orientation (i.e., innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness) are likely to adopt deviant
behavior in governance practices (Aguilera et al., 2018). Deviant firms do not adhere to
institutional logic so their performance is expected to be different from those operating within the
conformity zone.
2.2. Over-conformity and Legitimacy
Over-conformity is relatively an overlooked aspect of deviance and can be evaluated
differently by a social audience (Heckert & Heckert, 2002). There are some situations that firms
can gain more legitimacy by exceeding the norm. This situation is called “unattainable-ideal” and
refers to the monotonic growth of legitimacy with increasing degrees of conformity. The number
of publications a scholar has is an example of this norm, for which no optimum exist.
There are also situations that after a certain degree of conformity, the legitimacy remains
constant. This “attainable-ideal” situation refers to monotonically increasing legitimacy rewards
for conformity up to a point, with no additional legitimacy afterward. For a driving license test,
after approval by the officer, the driver is no greater a hero if he is an excellent driver than he is
average.
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In some other situations, deviation in both sides (i.e., under and over-conformity) is
disvalued. This situation is called “preferred-value” and refers to a continuous increase in
legitimacy up to an optimum level with monotonic decreases thereafter. For example, if a
supervisor is asked to coordinate three projects each season, approaching that number increases
the legitimacy, but exceeding that drives criticism for too much pressure. Assessing the impact of
institutional response cannot occur without considering these varied types of legitimacy (Bascle,
2016; March, 1954).
2.3. Board Female Representation Over-conformity and Accounting Performance
Accounting performance—in the form of profitability and mainly represented by return on
asset or equity— is a long-standing and traditional mainstay of strategic management approaches
to gauge how well a firm can use its assets (Otley, 2001). Previous research acknowledges that the
quality and competence of board members can make difference in accounting performance (e.g.,
Post & Byron, 2015). One of the major resources that determine the value of directors is the input
they bring such as counsel and novel perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Due to the traditional
barriers for women in attaining roles at high levels of organizations (Davidson & Cooper, 1992),
women who make it into boardrooms are typically the survivors of discriminatory processes and
therefore tend to be exceedingly competent (Eagly & Carli, 2003). This competency increases the
value of female directors as a resource in the eyes of internal stakeholders. Internal stakeholders
including the managers and employees use resources to enhance firm performance, and their
perception toward female directors affects the effectiveness of women of firm performance.
To compensate for gender biases, female directors are expected to be more proficient than
male executives are in a wide variety of skills. In addition to competency, women usually have
different occupational backgrounds than their male counterparts (Barbulescu & Bidwell, 2013)
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helping them improve problem-solving related decisions (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003) and
positively change board functioning (Terjesen, Couto, & Francisco, 2016). Women as minorities
often bring a new viewpoint to solve complicated issues and help in reducing biases in the
formulation of strategy (Francoeur, Labelle & Sinclair-Desgagné, 2008).
The resource dependence theory considers the role of resources in affecting firm behavior
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Prior experience of executives is important and can explain the value
they bring into boardrooms (Hambrick, 2007). Access to particular expertise can leverage the role
of female directors and their unique experiences garnered in other fields can contribute to highquality board decision making within the board. Increased female representation may influence
both what information is brought to bear in decision-making and how decisions are made. Taking
together with other research, women are more likely to benefit from the non-business background
and a portfolio of experience that help them understand certain situations better than their male
counterparts (Arfken, Bellar & Helms, 2004). Managing the diverse stakeholders’ needs require
diversified skills and experiences.
Female directors are expected to exhibit more feminine roles such as sympathy (Eagly
1987), and these feminine attributes can be leveraged to improve the functionality of corporate
boards in several ways. First, prior research shows that females are adept at developing trust with
others (Maddux & Brewer, 2005). Trust plays an important role in task coordination,
communication, information exchange, and surveillance (Currall & Judge, 1995). Second, another
role associate with women is flexibility, which enhances women’s ability to manage uncertain
situations (Rosener, 1995). Third, female directors are expected to be less power-oriented than
male directors and more inclined to share power (Adams & Funk, 2012), which can facilitate
collaboration. Fourth, females have been shown to be better than males in resolving conflicts (e.g.,
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Nielsen & Huse, 2010), because they are socialized to value nurturing and cooperative
arrangements (Eagly & Johnson, 1990). Accordingly, women’s presence is a valuable resource
that can facilitate the formulation and implementation of strategies, therefore, helps the firm
exploit the opportunities and neutralize the threats in the environment.
Taken together with other research, there is almost universal agreement in the academic
literature that independent members can increase transparency and board monitoring within the
firm. Women, by not belonging to the old networks of boardrooms, correspond more closely to
the concept of independent directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). In addition, their presence gives
rise to the level of board activity (Virtanen, 2012), because women attend more meetings and are
more ready for the meetings (Adams & Ferreira 2009; Pathan & Faff 2013). More female directors
are usually characterized by more monitoring of the CEO and greater alignment with the interests
of shareholders’ participation in decision-making (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).
The advantages that women can bring to the boardroom need to be valued and create value
in order for them to contribute to performance. Profitability is an indicative of how well a firm
efficiently utilizes its resources to generate profit, therefore, the value of resources should be
perceived positively so they can generate profitability. Repeated interactions between internal
stakeholders, such as managers and employees, and female directors provide opportunities for this
positive perception and mitigate the deep-rooted negative gender stereotypes that might hinder the
aforementioned benefits of high board female representation. Therefore, we do not expect that an
optimum level of conformity with board female representation norms exists, after which the
board's functionality reduces. In addition to the advantages of female directors for accounting
performance acknowledged by previous studies (please see the Meta-analysis of Post & Byron,
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2015), firms that exceed the gender diversity norm benefit from differentiation which can create
reputational benefits both inside and outside of the firm.
In sum, profitability is a traditional measure of operational efficiency and it is determined
using principles of accounting. Hence, the key stakeholders likely to be influenced by gender
over-conformity will be internal, operational members. The most direct operational members
influenced by female board members will be the top management team who will be subjected to
higher levels of scrutiny and transparency. In addition, the rest of the organization is likely to be
influenced by the reputational benefits of over-conformance to a desired standard, and perhaps
even gain a competitive advantage in recruitment and retention of women. Therefore, the net
positive perceptions of the internal stakeholders matter and should be able to generate genuine
operational efficiencies that lead to enhanced profitability We also expect these perceptions to be
positive due to close interactions between internal stakeholders and female directors, which
provide less room for negative stereotypes. Building on these arguments, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1. Over-conformity with board female representation logic reinforces
accounting performance in the form of higher profitability (i.e. unattainable-ideal).

2.4. Board Female Representation Over-conformity and Market Performance
Market performance refers to the behavior of a security in the public equity marketplace,
reflecting shareholders’ perceptions and expectations of the long-term value of a firm. While
shareholders can exist within and outside of the firm, the vast majority of public firms based in the
USA are external to the firm, predominantly held by pension funds (Economics 21, 2014).
Institutional investors own about 78% of the market value of the U.S. broad-market and Russell
3000 index, and above 80% of the large-cap S&P 500 index (Pensions & Investments, 2017). As
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a result, shareholders mainly consist of external actors, who have less direct interaction with
female directors, as compared to internal organizational stakeholders, and hence, are more likely
to rely on stereotypes.
Previous research suggests that shareholders perceive women differently than they
perceive men, and react differently to their presence (Lee & James, 2007). This perception may
affect the demand for female directors and the corporate environment they experience as board
members (Ryan & Haslam, 2007). According to RDT, directors have access to resources that can
be leveraged in the relationship between firm and external actors including external shareholders.
Market performance reflects the shareholders' valuation of resources a firm holds, including the
representation of female directors. Therefore, we conceptualize the value women add to the
boardroom from the perspective of institutional shareholders.
Oddly, the way that corporate America and most companies in the world operate hinders
easy communication between shareholders and directors. There are increasing calls from
shareholders to make connections with directors (Strätling, 2003), however, there are still not
enough policies providing for shareholder-director engagement. Investors need to learn about the
firm and the board through public documents and there are rare opportunities to make immediate
contact with directors even in annual meetings (Dealbook, 2014). Lack of opportunity to interact
with directors exacerbates the information asymmetry between directors and institutional investors
increasing the role of stereotypes in making a judgment about directors.
Stereotypes toward women can generally hinder their effectiveness in positions of power,
therefore their value from resource perspective (Eagly, 1987). For accounting performance, the
close interaction between the perceiver (managers and employees) and female directors mitigates
the negative stereotypes permitting less biased valuation of women as resources. However, for
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market performance due to more information asymmetry between shareholders and female
directors, these stereotypes start to play a moderate role. There is evidence suggesting that repeated
encounters with a person increase the depth of knowledge about that person (Häfner & Stapel,
2009). This motivates customized processing and can decrease the impact of stereotypes. We can
expect this opportunity to know female directors increases with the extent of engagement of
different stakeholders with them. This translates into lower stereotypes by internal stakeholders
and higher stereotypes by external stakeholders.
Market performance does not necessarily reflect the accounting performance of a firm (Lee
& James, 2007). Rather, it is influenced by general market conditions as well as the collective
evaluation of shareholder’s expectations regarding future cash flows. Since these shareholders are
also human evaluators operating from a distance, their gender biases are much likely to play a key
role in their overall evaluation. While shareholders benefit from women's presence in several ways
(e.g., Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2010), these advantages have been mainly valued for the
participation of female directors as minorities. The presence of a few women with male directors
is likely to please shareholders in order to avoid being perceived as “backward”. But, when firms
have female representation that is notably above other firms in the industry, in the eyes of
institutional investors, women’s role changes from a secondary and moderating actor to an active
one with the power.
From a societal perspective, women are generally viewed unfavorably for positions that
are associated with power, control, and authority, a setting that typifies board positions (Eagly,
1987). More specifically, according to gender stereotypes, women are expected to be communal,
showing empathy and concern for others; while men are expected to show more bold, agentic
behavior (Konrad, Ritchie Jr, Lieb & Corrigall, 2000). Due to the absence of enough history of
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dominant female representation in upper echelon positions traditionally linked with powerful
agentic behavior makes evaluating their contribution difficult, creating uncertainty with women’s
presence above the norm. Taken together, the deeply rooted unfavorable attitudes toward women
in positions of power may signal that the firm has abandoned its focus on economic objectives to
an over-emphasis on social objectives.
Having board female representation that is not notably different from other firms in the
industry is less likely to activate gender stereotypes, as it is perceived as a common practice.
Exceeding above the norm of the institutions increases the risk a firm is exposed to. While this risk
can translate into a differentiation strategy and enhance accounting performance through
competitive advantage, shareholders may not prefer taking this risk. Indeed, there is evidence
suggesting that risk-averse investors may discount women's nomination to the boardroom due to
few precedents on which they can rely to evaluate the performance of female directors (Litov,
Moreton & Zenger, 2012). Because there is information asymmetry between shareholders and
firms, equity prices do not fully reflect the performance-based value of firms. This information
asymmetry decreases the tendency of shareholders to embrace additional risks.
Managers and employees are more directly exposed to the target and are less likely to
believe that women are not suitable for power positions. This allows the boardroom to leverage
female attributes such as flexibility and conflict resolution to enhance board effectiveness. For
institutional investors, they are more likely to rely on the existing negative gender stereotypes due
to their distant relationship mostly framed by official documentation. Particularly, when firms
adopt over-conformity to norms, the embedded uncertainty in this unique position increases
information costs (Stiglitz, 2002), hindering an ever-increasing legitimacy with female
representation. While shareholders encourage responding to institutional demands and not being
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laggards, they discourage being pioneers given the associated risks with female representation
over-conformity. Hence, due to negative stereotypes toward female directors, which remains due
to lack of enough interaction between them and shareholders, we put forth the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Over-conformity to board female representation logic decreases marketbased performance (i.e. preferred-value).

2.5. Board Female Representation Over-conformity and Innovation Performance
A broader conceptualization of performance includes indicators of non-financial
performance referred to as “operational” performance (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). By
considering operational performance, we are able to go beyond the exclusive use of financial
indicators and examine the black box of key factors that lead to financial performance. Managers
are particularly attentive to operational performance constructs that help them have a sustainable
competitive advantage since they are more proximate (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). One
of the most widely used operational performance indicators is innovativeness. For firms to survive
in intensive competition, creativity and innovation are crucial to prosperity and survival, especially
within developed economies (Porter, 1990).
The RDT focuses on access to resources, and one of the main resources for innovativeness
is information. In order to promote innovation, a very select group of stakeholders influences the
flow of information. Having a good position within the network increases access to information
and facilitates R&D activities. Innovativeness requires collaboration with other firms that are
successful in innovation and conduct R&D projects, and is highly dependent on access to critical
resources (Rojas, Solis & Zhu, 2018). An organization’s position within a network matters for
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access to information as well as the opportunity of making networks with another focal firm,
particularly high-tech partnership (Hagedoorn, Roijakkers & Van Kranenburg, 2006). Negative
gender stereotypes can hinder women’s access to networks, which could result in lower access to
resources required for innovativeness. This is consistent with the tendency for maintaining the
token status of women in the high tech firms, which mainly operate within the old boy network
(Wheadon & Duval-Couetil, 2019).
This negative perception of arms-length resource providers operating within the firm’s
innovation ecology may result in diminished information flows into and out of the organization.
While a regular gender composition may not attract specific attention, for boards with female
representation higher than the norm, gender might become an important evaluation criterion,
therefore, the perception of resource providers toward women becomes vital for firms. For firms
with female representation above the norm, the disadvantage of women in access to networks
becomes more noticeable and influential compared to firms with a norm level of women. This can
decrease the value of women in firms that seek innovativeness.
Resource providers evaluate board of directors based on its potential to behave
innovatively. Therefore, they assess women’s presence based on (1) its impact on innovation as
well as (2) access to alternative other external resources that can expedite innovation outcomes.
First, there is an ongoing debate on the link between female representation and
innovativeness and much left unknown about how gender composition influences the innovation
performance of a firm (Strohmeyer, Tonoyan & Jennings, 2017). For a firm to have a good
innovation performance, in addition to being able to come up with novel ideas, the competence for
taking considered risk is required (Amabile, 1988).
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While there is evidence in favor of gender diversity and creativity (Galia & Zenou, 2012;
Robinson & Dechant, 1997), many scholars argue against any substantial benefits of female
representation for innovativeness. For example, Strohmeyer and associates (2017) find that firms
with more women in leadership positions tend to exhibit less innovation than those headed by men.
There are some arguments that diversity of opinions may decrease cohesiveness among board
members resulting in impeded decision-making (Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 1994; Triana,
Miller & Trzebiatowski, 2014). Diversity may introduce conflict and degrade interactions, which
could hinder the ability of firm for successful innovativeness. This may concern external resource
providers looking for innovation outcomes by firm so it can yield, productive collaborations with
network partners.
In general, the literature has an equivocal position for the relationship between female
representation and innovation, risk-taking competency also becomes a concern for resource
providers in regard to women. There is support from multiple disciplines that women, including
those in executive roles, are more risk-averse and conservative in decision-making than men
(Jeong and Harrison, 2017; Kirsch, 2018). While higher perceived risk leads to more information
gathering and more risk adjustment (i.e., increasing control over outcomes or reducing exposure
to potential loss) (Pablo, Sitkin, and Jemison, 1996), in general, there are negative stereotypes
assuming women are not inclined to take risk (e.g., Badura, Grijalva, Newman & Jeon, 2018).
These stereotypes are especially salient for external resource providers, who usually do not have
repeated encounters with the board members, and with less encounter, there is less depth of
knowledge about people (Häfner & Stapel, 2009). For firms that exceed above the norm for female
representation, compared to those residing in the conformity zone, it becomes more challenging to
overcome the traditional negative gender stereotypes of resource providers.

62

Second, in addition to negative perception toward women in terms of direct impact on
innovation, stakeholders evaluate them negatively in terms of access to alternative resources
facilitating innovativeness indirectly. Beyond the monitoring and controlling role of the board of
directors (Daily et al., 2003), one key responsibility of boards is to bring resources to the firm
(Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000). These resources can help firms managing
challenges and better deal with external organizations (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 1972). The scarcity of
external resources underscores the importance of using social and professional ties to overcome
the difficulties of access to essential resources (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003). Unlike traditional social
science, the relationship between actors is focal, and best organizations are not necessarily those
with the best resources, but those with a better web of relationships referred to as networks (Burt,
1992). Based on two prominent strands of social network literature including network status (Lin,
1999) and network diversity (e.g. Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1983), the extent to which networks
consist of contacts with higher status positions and the extent to which networks consist of different
types of contacts can impact access to valuable resources.
Gender composition of owners and directors is an important feature in the chance of access
to external resources, and anecdotal evidence suggests female disadvantage in the eyes of resource
provider (e.g., Buttner & Rosen, 1989; Drago, Millo, Ricciuti & Santella, 2012; Brush, Greene,
Balachandra & Davis, 2018). While early work regarding networks indicated that women have
more diverse networks (Ibarra 1992, 1993), more recent works by ruling out the role of families,
suggest that in a global network of interlocking directors, women do not have a strong position
(Drago et al., 2012). Moreover, women’s network usually consists of some specific contacts,
usually other female directors, which can be valuable but if female representation exceeds the
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norm, compared to competitors, a firm might lose access to other networks. This decreases the
value of women in the eyes of focal firms in the network looking for innovation collaboration.
Taken together, resource providers are likely to have negative perceptions toward women
in a leadership position for their direct and indirect impact on innovativeness (e.g., Drago et al.,
2012); which is more noticeable when firms exceed the norm for board female representation.
Furthermore, women, as newcomers to this innovation network, are less likely to have access the
networking ideas and resource flows. Hence, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3. Over-conformity to board female representation logic decreases
innovation performance (i.e. preferred-value).

3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Data and sample
The sample used in this paper is constructed from a dataset obtained from Bloomberg,
which is a comprehensive database that tracks financial and non-financial information for a large
set of firms. We focus on publicly-traded companies in multiple industries in the U.S. from 20092019. In the initial sample, there were missing values, and some of the firms were duplicated due
to cross-listing. We deleted those firms whose country of domicile (the country where major
management activities take place) was different from the country of listing to avoid multiple
national logics for one firm. The final sample with data for board female representation consists
of 3,670 firms and an unbalanced panel data set of 29,980 firm-years observations (n = 3670, T =
1-11, N=29,980) for 12 industries. After dealing with missing values for each indicator, for
accounting performance N= 18299, for market performance N=17887, and for innovation
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performance N=6086. All of the below variables including the control variables are extracted from
Bloomberg and consist of observations from 2009-2019.
3.2. Dependent variables
Accounting performance. For accounting performance, Return on Equity (ROE),
computed as net income divided by shareholder’s equity, which is a widely used proxy for
organization-wide performance (Bennouri et al., 2018), has been considered to show the success
of firms in using their resources to add value to their assets.
Market performance. For market performance, we measured the commonly used Tobin’s
Q indicator, computed as the market value of a company divided by its assets' replacement cost,
which is used to capture shareholders’ perceptions and expectations of the long-term value of a
firm (e.g., Post & Byron, 2015).
Innovation performance. For this operational performance measure, we focused on the
extent of patents produced by the corporation. For the proxy, we used a continuous indicator that
Bloomberg provides using the company's reports for patents. “The account title may be
standardized and slightly different from the original account title in the company's financial
statement".
3.3. Independent variables
Board Female Representation Over-conformity is measured using a categorical variable
related to the level of conformity relative to the prevailing institutional logic. Three categories (i.e.,
under-conformity, conformity, and over-conformity) are formed based on the position of female
representation regarding the institutional norm. This approach provides comparisons between
different levels of deviance and enables us to test our hypotheses for their performance
implications.
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To differentiate between types of deviance, we take μ ± SD as the cutoff point. First, we
measure board female representation by calculating the percentage of female members on the
board, which has been widely used in the literature (e.g., Grosvold, & Brammer, 2011; Terjesen
and Singh, 2008). Then, the average (μ) of female representation per year per industry has
considered as the base. Observations within the μ ± SD range have been considered as conformity,
while under-conformity refers to observations with female representation lower than μ – SD, and
female representation higher than μ + SD represents over-conformity.
[Insert Table 2.1 about here]
3.4. Control variables
We include several control variables that have been shown in the previous studies to impact firm
performance.
Size. Prior research has shown that the size of firms tends to impact firm performance
directly and indirectly (Connolly & Hirschey, 2005). Firm size is measured as the logarithm of
assets in the firm.
Outsider. Some scholars argue that a greater proportion of independent directors on the
board of a firm can increase firm performance (Terjesen et al., 2016). The Outsiders variable is
measured as the percentage of independent directors in the boardroom.
Leverage. The extent of total financial debt to asset referred to as the leverage ratio is
another variable that impacts the level of risk in organizations and is reported to be negatively
correlated with performance (Mahakud & Misra, 2009).
Payout Ratio. This variable measures the percentage a company paid out in dividends and
repurchases of common shares. It is a major factor affecting firm performance (Ouma, 2012).
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Duality. CEO duality is a dummy variable that reflects whether a CEO is also the board
chair. Duality has been reported to influence performance (e.g., Boyd, 1995).
Free Cash Flow. This measure refers to operating cash flow minus capital expenditures. It
represents the cash that firms can generate after laying out the money required to maintain or
expand their assets. Free cash flow is reported to have a correlation with firm performance (Brush,
Bromiley & Hendrickx, 2000).
R&D Expenditure. This variable refers to research and development expenditures as a
percentage of revenue (net sales). Morbey (1988) found a strong association between R&D
spending and subsequent performance.
3.5. Analysis and Results
Since our sample has multiple observations for firms across different years, we used the
generalized estimating equations technique to avoid autocorrelation among the within-group
observations. Generalized estimating equations (GEE) are suitable for handling panel data
(Ballinger, 2004).
Figure 2.1 shows some visual statistics about the distribution of female representation across
industries and years, along with the frequency of different institutional responses to the norms of
the industry. Part A shows a smooth increasing trend for board female representation over time.
Part B shows an average of around 11% for female representation on our sample and a notable
number of firms with 0% female representation. Part C shows a fair distribution of our observations
over different industries and part D shows a normal distribution of institutional responses to female
representation logic.
[Insert Figure 2.1 about here]
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Table 2.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for our variables and Table 2.2 shows the
pairwise correlation between variables. Since categorical variables cannot enter correlation
equations, the independent variable is eliminated from the table. However, assessing the variance
inflation factors of our variables show that the maximum VIF is 1.59 and multicollinearity is not
an issue (Hair, Anderson, Babin & Black, 2010).
[Insert Table 2.2 about here]
Table 2.3 shows the results for accounting performance measured as ROE. In addition to
over-conformity, the results for under-conformity have also been reported to support the notion
that non-conformity has different manifestations and under-conformity and over-conformity can
have different implications. Our findings show that under-conformity is associated with lower
accounting-based performance than conformity (β = -1.80, p < 0.05), over-conformity has higher
accounting-based performance than under-conformity (β = 4.86, p < 0.001) and conformity (β =
3.06, p < 0.001). In sum, hypothesis 1 is supported by our data suggesting that board female overconformity will increase the accounting performance (i.e., unattainable ideal).
[Insert Table 2.3 about here]
Table 2.4 presents the coefficient estimates of the regression equation for market
performance. In Model 1, we include the control variables set. In Model 2, we set conformity as
the base category to be able to compare it with the over-conformity. The insignificant difference
between conformity and over-conformity leaves hypothesis 2 unsupported.
[Insert Table 2.4 about here]
Table 2.5 then suggests a negative impact of over-conformity on innovativeness compared
to conformity (β = -78.70, p < 0.05) supporting the assertion of hypothesis 3 that exceeding above
the norm causes a decrease in innovation performance.
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[Insert Table 2.5 about here]
Overall, our data show that firms with over-conformity to board female representation
experience a greater accounting performance, however, this is not reflected in market performance.
This indicates a misalignment between board functionality and perception toward that. Finally, our
results show that firms adopting over-conformity have a significantly lower innovation
performance than those that conform. In sum, the performance effect of gender over-conformity
appears to be in the eye of the beholder.
3.6. Robustness Check
First, we test the results for an alternative measure of over-conformity, which is a
continuous departure from the mean. Therefore, we focus on observations in which female
representation is above the mean and compute over-conformity as the difference between board
female representation and the mean. According to this test, the results hold.
Second, to deal with endogeneity, we used a lagged dependent variable (Lu, Ding, Peng &
Chuang, 2018) as an instrument to estimate our full theoretical model. Such an approach in
estimating a full model is not supported by the GEE estimator, which is more appropriate to
account for various correlation structures (e, g. exchangeable, independent, and autoregressive) of
the covariates. Greene (2003) outlines a generalized least square approach with stringent
asymptotic normality assumption in which a lagged dependent variable is appropriate. We follow
Greene (2003) and estimate our theoretical model using a GLS estimator and use the lagged
dependent variable as an instrumental variable. According to the results for this test our original
assertions hold.
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4. DISCUSSION
The surge of female representation on corporate boards is unprecedented in the past decade. This
has given rise to the interest in understanding the contribution of women to firm performance
(Kirsch, 2018), especially knowing the boundary conditions that explain when female
representation is perceived more desirable (Byron & Post, 2016). In this study, we examined the
rarely acknowledged link between board female representation over-conformity to the institutional
logic and financial and non-financial performance implications.
Our multi-industry sample of 3,670 American publicly traded firms from 2009-2019
supports the pillars of our argument, namely, the influence of organizational response to
institutional logic on value creation by female directors, the differential effect of deviation based
on the type of non-conformity, and the variation of performance implication across different
indicators. This study seeks to enrich the understanding of the effect of female representation overconformity on firm performance by showing that compliance with institutional logic has a different
impact on performance than deviance from it. Our results speak for the importance of considering
not just the institutional context for corporate governance logic, but the firm's response to these
logics when studying value creation by female directors.
While our results show that firms with a relatively high level of female representation
benefit from high accounting performance due to a combination of good characteristics associated
with female directors and a differentiated position regarding the competitors, the reactions of
shareholders and external resource providers are remarkably different. Recently, Mateos De Cabo,
Gimeno, Grau & Gabaldon (2020) in a gender diversity imitation game study found that firms with
over-conformity with female representation tend to decrease it to the average of their industry,
while firms with under-conformity do not have the same mimetic tendency to increase it to the
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average. This can be detrimental for board female representation over time by pulling down the
average; therefore, it is of paramount importance to understand why this pattern exists. Our study
explains that the negative reaction of external stakeholders to over-conformity despite a positive
accounting performance may serve as a discouraging factor forcing firms to push back from overconformity to female representation. Also, our study argues that over-conformity can exacerbate
the negative gender stereotypes and more encounters between resource providers and female
directors or a stronger access to alternative resources (e.g., network) are required for female
directors to decrease the challenges for firms with over-conformity.
The study of board female representation deviance is of notable merit because board gender
composition is one of the most visible attributes of firms (Lynall et al., 2003) and the way women
actually behave and are perceived to behave are highly contingent on societal norms (Zajac &
Westphal, 1996). Our findings offer several theoretical and practical implications.
4.1. Theoretical Implications
Using organizational response to institutional logic to explain the value creation of female
directors, we respond to the call for more research on the boundary conditions of this value (Byron
& Post, 2016) and its variation over different performance indicators for female representation
(Post & Byron, 2015). Given the current popularity of board gender composition arguments,
particularly in comparative corporate governance literature (Knippen, Shen & Zhu, 2019), and
growing attention to the organizational agency (Saka-Helmhout, 2020), the intersection of these
two provides a ground that is of interest for scholars of both institutional theory and corporate
governance field.
Contribution to Resource Dependence Theory
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Resource dependence theory is one of the widely used theories in gender and diversity field
and a successful lens for understanding boards (Hillman et al., 2009). While this theory explains
the sources and consequences of power in affecting firms, we argue that these consequences can
vary depending on who perceives them. Performance has multiple indicators, each of which deals
with different types of stakeholders. For directors to be able to influence the power and dependence
within organizations and in regard to external environment, they should be able to operate
properly. However, sometimes other actors who are working with female directors can impede
their functionality. As a result, the same factor can have different impacts on power and
dependence based on how different stakeholders provide ground for that factor to create influence.
While internal stakeholders utilize women’s advantage to increase power and decrease
dependence, external stakeholders due to their negative perception toward women do not provide
ground for using the same advantages.
We draw on gender stereotypes to differentiate among different stakeholders based on how
they may perceive women suggesting that the negative stereotypes toward female directors vary
depending on the perceiver. This is the first study that tests the impact of gender stereotypes on
multi-dimensional indicators of performance using a dataset that includes firms from different
industries. Our results shed light on which indicator is mostly affected by negative stereotypes and
indicate variations of gender stereotypes. We refer to the evidence suggesting that repeated
encounters with a person increase the depth of knowledge about that person (Häfner & Stapel,
2009) to show that resource providers and shareholders have more negative gender stereotypes
than managers and employees. Therefore, we suggest that gender stereotypes have different
manifestations for these stakeholders, which in turn affect the value they put on women's presence.
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So we enrich RDT by arguing that the same factor can be either valuable or detrimental in different
situations.
We also extend RDT by arguing that the value of a factor in affecting power and
dependence is not necessarily ever increasing. In other words, for a factor that positively influences
firm’s position in regard to the control of resources and power, there might be a limit for this
influence. While a factor is valuable from RDT perspective, we argue that applying institutional
logic and subsequent organizational response to that can change the impact of a factor in a way
that a positive impact can turn into a negative one given the position a firm takes in regard to
institutional norm.
Contribution to Gender & Diversity Literature
By integrating insights from gender stereotypes and resource perspective, we argue that
gender stereotypes can be used as a valuable resource in favor of firm in situations that close
interaction with female directors helps managers and employees to better understand those female
attributes that can be helpful in leadership positions and use them to facilitate collaboration and
enhance the functionality of boardroom. Adding insight from social network literature, we also
suggest that the weak position of women in access to strong and varied networks reduces the
likelihood that resource providers find an opportunity to know female directors and use it as a way
to decrease the uncertainty and associated stereotypes toward women in power. In sum, we
advance gender literature to better explain the application of gender stereotypes for value creation
by female directors, especially in regard to agentic behavior of organizations.
We also contribute to gender and diversity literature by arguing how the organizational
response to institutional logic can act as a boundary condition, changing the value creation of board
female representation. Arriving at the conclusion that board female representation has a positive
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impact on performance in some countries and negative in some others can be insufficient without
considering the organizational response to institutional logic. There is a stream of literature
suggesting that the potential impact of female representation on organizational outcomes is
sensitive to organizational characteristics (e.g., Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay & Zhao, 2011;
Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella, 2007). Another stream acknowledges that performance
consequences are embedded in institutional context (e.g., Abdullah et al., 2016; Black, Jang &
Kim, 2006). Using insights from resource dependence theory, this study joins the conversations
about the variation of board female representation effect on firm performance by theorizing on the
extent of conformity to institutional logic.
Contribution to the Corporate Governance Deviance Literature
Focusing on outcomes, this study advances corporate governance deviance literature.
While previous studies discuss an actor-centered institutional approach to explain corporate
governance practices (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2018) little is known about the
performance implication of various organizational responses to corporate governance practices
within the same institutional context. Corporate governance deviance theory explains the
antecedents and argues that the entrepreneurial orientation of firms gives rise to deviant behavior
(Aguilera et al., 2018), leaving the way adopting deviation can differently change financial and
non-financial performance underexplored.
According to corporate governance deviance theory, having an innovativeness mindset
embedded in the entrepreneurial orientation of firms is shown to drive deviation from corporate
governance norms (Aguilera et al., 2018), however, interestingly we showed that adopting overconformity for some governance practices can eventually decrease innovation performance. One
might expect to see that taking radical initiative and non-conformity to norms should lead to more

74

innovativeness. However, our results indicate that for female representation logic it can even
decrease innovative outcomes. Scholars need to examine this relationship in a different context as
the nature of this relationship seems to be highly contingent on the type of governance practice.
The widespread policy interest in promoting innovative practices related to women speaks of the
importance of scientific evidence that sheds light on this relationship (Ahl & Nelson, 2015).
Moreover, we enrich governance deviance literature by underscoring the importance of
considering the type of performance. This research takes a multi-dimensional approach and by
showing the variation across different levels of performance, it serves to boost our understanding
of the specificity of the link between female representation and performance. There are calls for
more research that rather than mainly focusing on financial performance to explain the value
creation of women on the board, examine other increasingly important issues such as how feminine
perspective may affect innovation research (Alsos, Hytti, & Ljunggren, 2016; Brush, Eddleston,
Edelman, Manolova & McAdam, 2020).
Finally, we differentiated between the type of non-conformity, which is not very common
in the literature, and applied it to a less explored but important field named gender diversity.
Examining agentic behavior for board female representation is very recent and the notable
exception (Mateos De Cabo et al., 2020) do not consider performance implications. Due to high
public scrutiny for board female representation, stakeholders might be sensitive to organizational
response to the norm making this context a suitable one to study implications of corporate
governance deviance literature.
4.2. Practical Implications
Despite all progress toward female representation, their presence in Fortune 500 companies
is still far below half of the boardroom (ISS Analytics). We show that despite increasing calls from
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governments and policymakers, there is no extra reward in the stock market for firms that have
female representation higher than their industry competitors. That may explain why these firms
tend to decrease their female representation over time (Mateos De Cabo et al., 2020) and calls for
attention from policymakers to find a solution to avoid the discouragement and subsequent push
back from increasing board female representation. Also, our study argues that over-conformity can
exacerbate the negative gender stereotypes and more encounters between resource providers and
female directors or a stronger network for women is required to decrease the challenges for firms
with over-conformity.
For managers, strategies for female representation should be formed with recognition of
female representation norms within an institutional context. Managers need to be cognizant of the
boundary conditions of value creation by female directors including when their presence exceeds
the norm. In addition, our findings show that the opportunity and challenges associated with overconformity differ across different indicators. So the decision for organizational response to board
female representation institutional logic should be made with an eye on the type of desired
performance. For managers that seek accounting performance, exceeding above the norm might
be an ideal strategy; however, for those who seek innovation performance, more consideration is
required. Finally, for female directors who seek to enhance their impact on board, which requires
more support stakeholders, trying to increase the level of interaction is a proper way to make
positive perceptions. Close interaction and repeated encounters with employees and managers,
institutional investors and resource providers will boost the chance of women to overcome the
negative gender stereotypes and work more efficiently.
4.3. Limitations and Future Research
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This study has some limitations that should be acknowledged and can provide directions
for future research. First, our results need to be verified in multi-country samples. There is a
significant difference between developed and emerging economies in terms of perception toward
women. In emerging markets, there are more unfavorable attitudes toward women in positions of
control and power (Abdullah et al., 2016). Moreover, female directors in these countries can differ
from developed countries in terms of capabilities and access to resources. By considering the norm
of the country, we address this concern, but the generalizability of our findings needs to be
confirmed in different contexts.
Second, we acknowledge that we do not directly measure the perception of stakeholders
toward women. Our argument is tested based on the potential impact of their perception on firm’s
performance. Given the abstract nature of value, and the highly tied link between performance and
resource value we believe that our different indicators of performance are outcomes of the
perception of stakeholders. However, future studies would benefit from qualitative studies that
take a more nuanced examination of this perception and its impact on performance.
Third, performance has numerous indicators. Future research can examine different
operationalization of financial, operational, and effectiveness levels. It can also go beyond the
simple measures and include performance dynamism, which refers to the absolute change between
the prior year and the focal year (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). There is evidence supporting the
view that boards with greater gender diversity have lower performance volatility (dynamism)
(Bernile, Bhagwat & Yonker, 2018), and this can be examined with female representation position
regarding the norm. Another manifestation is performance extremeness, which refers to the firm’s
absolute difference from the industry average (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Compromising the
insights from institutional theory and strategic perspective, one might expect that deviation in both
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sides gives rise to extreme performance, which can be reflected in big profit, originated from
distinctiveness, or big loss, originated from misevaluation of governance setting. Further, women
are expected to bring unique preferences and views resulting in heterogeneity in the boardroom
and ultimately less extreme outcomes. Future research needs to shed light on this link.
Finally, we assume a direct causal relationship between board gender diversity and firm
performance. While firm performance remains a central interest of both practitioners and scholars,
there might be a more intermediate effect, such as board decision-making outcomes or influence
on organizational culture. As such, future studies of more intermediate outcomes would be
instructive. Furthermore, due to the lack of previous conceptual and empirical work, there may be
a moderating influence that clarifies this relationship. As such, future studies examining
moderating influences should be considered.
4.4. Conclusions
This is the first study that explains the rarely acknowledged link between agentic behavior
and firm performance by board female representation. While female representation is highly
contingent on societal expectations (Lynall et al., 2003; Zajac & Westphal, 1996), and previous
studies acknowledge that norm matters in explicating the outcomes associated with female
presence (Terjesen & Singh, 2008), surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the position a firm
takes regarding the norm. Scholars need to go beyond mere considering the norm of a country and
rather than suggesting that women's presence in emerging and developed economies are different,
explain how within the same context, positions in regard to the norm (e.g., exceeding the norm)
can yield different results. This concurrent investigation of institutional and organizational
behavior enhances our understanding of the value creation by female directors.
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Due to the inconsistent results in previous gender composition-firm performance studies
(e.g., Bennouri et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2001), this study ignores the moral argument for board
composition that largely represents the wider society. This utilitarian perspective reflects the state
of the policy debates, but we would be remiss if we did not mention non-utilitarian arguments for
more representative boards. From academia to business and society, the effects of gender quotas
are under scrutiny. Several reported misalignment between the moral solutions to increase gender
equality (e.g., introducing board gender quota) and firm’s performance (Raleigh, 2018) speaks of
the importance of joint consideration of ethical and economic perspectives in regard to board
female representation. In this study, we discuss the outcomes associated with exceeding the
institutional norm. Our arguments open numerous ground for future studies to examine how
institutional logic paired with organizational response determines the performance consequences
of corporate governance practices.
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TABLE 2.1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
ROA
Tobin’s Q
Innovativeness
Deviance
Conformity
Under-conformity
Over-conformity
Size
Outsider
Leverage
Payout Ratio
Duality
Free Cash Flow
R&D Expenditure

Obs
28855
28064
9509
.
29980
29980
29980
28952
28072
28939
18948
28262
28605
20164

Mean
-17.151
4.879
247.626
.
.679
.169
.152
6.78
76.873
61.375
288.63
.382
220.463
441.345

Std. Dev.
354.891
26.615
2373.697
.
.467
.375
.359
2.156
14.013
3645.953
25256.374
.486
2350.423
11341.982

Min
-26301.482
0
-68.4
.
0
0
0
-9.21
0
0
-1932.823
0
-85909
-6264.966

Max
474.856
1727.602
159315
.
1
1
1
15.069
100
607547.73
3449100
1
127491
1299100
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TABLE 2.2
Pairwise Correlations Between Measures
(N = 6086)
Variables
(1) ROA
(2) Tobin’s Q
(3) Innovativeness
(4) Size
(5) Outsider
(6) Leverage
(7) Payout Ratio
(8) Duality
(9) Free Cash Flow
(10) R&D Expenditure

(1)
1.00
-0.01*
0.01
0.10*
0.06*
-0.82*
0.00
-0.01
0.00
-0.02*

(2)
1.00
-0.00
-0.01*
-0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.00
0.00

* shows significance at the .01 level

(3)
1.00
0.20*
0.03*
0.02*
0.01
0.04*
0.34*
-0.00

(4)

(5)

1.00
0.27*
-0.08*
0.00
0.08*
0.21*
-0.05*

1.00
-0.04*
-0.00
-0.03*
0.05*
0.00

(6)

1.00
0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.00

(7)

1.00
-0.01
-0.00
-0.00

(8)

1.00
0.04*
-0.01

(9)

1.00
-0.01

(10)

1.00
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TABLE 2.3
Panel Data Estimations of Board Female Representation Over-conformity and Accounting
Performance
Model (1)

Dependent Variable: ROE
Model (2)
Model (3)

Size

-1.39***
(0.20)

-1.52***
(0.21)

-1.52***
(0.21)

Outsider

-0.07**
(0.02)

-0.06*
(0.02)

-0.06*
(0.02)

Leverage

0.24***
(0.02)

0.24***
(0.02)

0.24***
(0.02)

Payout Ratio

-0.00
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.00)

Duality

1.54**
(0.58)

1.52**
(0.58)

1.52**
(0.58)

Free Cash Flow

0.00***
(0.00)

0.00***
(0.00)

0.00***
(0.00)

−
−

1.80*
(0.77)

Under-conformity

-1.80*
(0.77)

−
−

Over-conformity

3.06***
(0.73)

4.86***
(1.00)

13.90***
(2.36)

16.04***
(2.44)

14.23***
(2.36)

17686

17686

17686

YES

YES

YES

281.9

307.9

Variables

Deviance

Non-conformity

Conformity

Constant
N
Year Fixed Effect

Chi-Square
307.9
GEE (generalized estimating equations) with exchangeable correlation structure
Standard errors in parentheses
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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TABLE 2.4
Panel Data Estimations of Board Female Representation Over-conformity and Market
Performance
Model (1)

Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
Model (2)
Model (3)

Size

-0.75***
(0.11)

-0.80***
(0.11)

-0.80***
(0.11)

Outsider

0.04***
(0.01)

0.04**
(0.01)

0.04**
(0.01)

Leverage

0.11***
(0.01)

0.11***
(0.01)

0.11***
(0.01)

Payout Ratio

-0.00
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.00)

Duality

0.77*
(0.32)

0.79*
(0.32)

0.77*
(0.32)

0.00***
(0.00)

0.00***
(0.00)

0.00***
(0.00)

−
−

0.97*
(0.43)

Under-conformity

-0.97*
(0.43)

−
−

Over-conformity

0.46
(0.41)

1.42**
(0.55)

Variables

Free Cash Flow
Deviance

Non-conformity

Conformity

Constant

2.37†
(1.28)

3.26*
(1.32)

2.29†
(1.28)

N

17887

17887

17887

YES

YES

YES

Year Fixed Effect

219
226.2
Chi-Square
226.2
GEE (generalized estimating equations) with exchangeable correlation structure
Standard errors in parentheses
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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TABLE 2.5
Panel Data Estimations of Board Female Representation Over-conformity and Innovation
Performance
Variables

Model (1)

Dependent Variable: Patent Count
Model (2)
Model (3)

255.30***

255.30***

255.30***

(24.29)

(24.35)

-0.08

(24.35)
0.16

(1.67)

(1.68)

(1.68)

0.41

0.43

0.43

(1.21)

(1.21)

(1.21)

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

(0.042)

(0.042)

(0.042)

17.37

18.29

18.29

(37.21)

(37.19)

(37.19)

0.23***

0.23***

0.23***

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

11.36**

11.26**

11.26**

(4.32)

(4.32)

(4.32)

−

-1.08

−

(44.88)

1.08

−

(44.88)

−

-78.70*

-79.78

(39.92)

(59.41)

-1761.80***

-1784.80***

-1783.70***

(210.50)

(212.30)

(211.50)

N

6086

6086

6086

Year Fixed Effect

YES

YES

YES

553.7

558.0

Size
Outsider
Leverage
Payout Ratio
Duality
Free Cash Flow
R&D Expenditure

0.16

Deviance

Non-conformity

Conformity
Under-conformity
Over-conformity
Constant

Chi-Square
558.0
GEE (generalized estimating equations) with exchangeable correlation structure
Standard errors in parentheses
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

91

FIGURE 2.1
Visual Statistics for Board Female Representation
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